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INTRODUCTION 
“The Court has long viewed the First Amendment as pro-
tecting a marketplace for the clash of different views and con-
flicting ideas.”1 Conceived a century ago by Justice Holmes as 
the central “theory of our Constitution,”2 the marketplace of 
ideas metaphor has become the dominant lens for judicial (and 
scholarly) free-speech analysis.3  
The metaphor’s popularity and durability owe to its pur-
ported ability to serve a range of different First Amendment val-
ues. For the deontologically minded, the marketplace of ideas 
protects the autonomy- and dignity-respecting values of free ex-
pression.4 For the instrumentalist, it safeguards public debate, 
open dialogue, and the foundations of democracy itself.5 For the 
 
 1. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 
(1981). 
 2. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).  
 3. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 
1697, 1697 (1999) (“In the marketplace of ideas, the idea of the marketplace of 
ideas enjoys a dominant market share.”). 
 4. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 203 (2014) (“[T]he First 
Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the public debate 
through political expression and political association.”); Charles Fried, The New 
First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN 
THE MODERN STATE 225, 233 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992) (“Freedom of 
expression is properly based on autonomy: the Kantian right of each individual 
to be treated as an end in himself . . . .”). 
 5. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010); Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 n.19 
(1976) (“This Court . . . has emphasized the role of the First Amendment in 
guaranteeing our capacity for democratic self-government.”); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and press was 
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dissenter, it offers a shield against government censorship and 
an opportunity for participation.6 And for all of us, it holds out 
the promise that through rigorous and free competition between 
ideas that which is good and true will prevail.7  
Or at least that’s the idea. Operating in the background of 
the modern market metaphor are contradictory conceptual as-
sumptions (about what a “marketplace of ideas” is, how it func-
tions, and what it accomplishes), false empirical premises (about 
how ideas spread, are consumed, and are evaluated), and a du-
bious historical pedigree. Where the Court imagines individuals 
consuming and weighing information on the merits, reality stub-
bornly persists in creating more content every minute than could 
be consumed in a lifetime, requiring us to rely on intermediaries 
that sort and shape the information we receive. Where the Court 
assumes the “best” ideas will gain assent and spread throughout 
society, existing doctrine provides no account of what resource 
“winning” provides or how consumer judgments are expected to 
feed back into the market. And where the Court envisions calcu-
lating individuals dispassionately comparing and contrasting in-
formation in a vacuum, a growing scientific consensus reveals 
intuitive beings construing content based on relationships, asso-
ciations, social identities, and innate biases.  
In short, the marketplace of ideas rests upon little more 
than slogans and fictions, none of which find support or sanctu-
ary in the views of Holmes, Madison, or the founding generation. 
 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.”). 
 6. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1965) (discussing the 
dangers of censorship under the First Amendment); TIMOTHY C. SHIELL, AFRI-
CAN AMERICANS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE CASE FOR LIBERTY AND 
EQUALITY 110 (2019) (discussing the principles of participation, anti-orthodoxy, 
and inclusion in the First Amendment). 
 7. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address, in THOMAS JEFFER-
SON: WRITINGS 492, 493 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (1801) (“[E]rror of opin-
ion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.”); JOHN STUART 
MILL, On Liberty, reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 21 (John Gray 
ed., 1998) (1859) (“[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion 
is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing genera-
tion . . . . If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchang-
ing error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the 
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with 
error.”); JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica: A Speech to the Parliament of England for 
the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, in AREOPAGITICA 1, 175 (T. Holt White ed., 
1819) (1644) (“Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to 
the wors[e], in a free and open encounter?”). 
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Rather than a graceful arrangement of timeless values and di-
verse virtues operating in harmony, the modern market meta-
phor has morphed into something else entirely: a straitjacket of 
wishful thinking that binds Congress—that binds all of us—to 
the Court’s alternate reality.  
This Article suggests that the current marketplace of ideas 
leaves out a core concept that should inform First Amendment 
analysis: attention. The terms of access to our attention, the 
choices we make about where to direct our attention, how these 
choices influence which ideas spread throughout society—all of 
these inquiries point the way towards a potentially more mean-
ingful, coherent, and realistic account of the marketplace of 
ideas, where the actual behavior of content consumers plays a 
central role. 
Building a theory of competition for the marketplace of ideas 
around this key feature of attentional choice also cabins and clar-
ifies the judicial role while expanding and explaining the scope 
of the legislative role. Judges can take a more nuanced approach 
to evaluating various market practices, incorporating actual 
facts into their assessments while remaining grounded by an en-
during and consistent principle. Legislators, meanwhile, can en-
act laws that protect and promote free attentional choice, relying 
similarly upon evolving empirical understandings. Just as Con-
gress can enact laws that safeguard economic competition and 
disrupt private restraints of trade, so too can Congress enact 
laws that enhance ideational competition and prevent anticom-
petitive private conduct. 
An attentional-choice lens also offers good reasons to revisit 
the Supreme Court’s campaign-finance jurisprudence. If our de-
centralized decision-making about where to allocate our atten-
tion is how ideational value is conferred in the marketplace of 
ideas, then all monetary expenditures should not necessarily re-
ceive equal constitutional protection. While expenditures to fa-
cilitate political expression should remain fully protected to pro-
mote free entry into the market,8 and expenditures to support 
distribution should remain fully protected to promote free com-
petition within the market,9 expenditures for political advertise-
ments—for example—do not deserve the level of constitutional 
protection they currently receive.10  
 
 8. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 9. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 10. See infra Part III.B.3.i. 
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Unlike funds that make content available to satisfy our at-
tentional choices (such as media company operating expenses or 
the cost of putting content online),11 advertising contracts in-
volve the outright purchase of attention.12 By definition, an ad-
vertisement contains content no one chose to consume from a 
source no one chose to trust with their attention. Whether one 
buys a quarter-page of space from a newspaper, thirty seconds 
of airtime from a network, or promoted exposure on social media, 
the expense provides access to attention on primarily economic 
terms in a way that circumvents the mechanism by which idea-
tional value is conferred. In other words, the Supreme Court’s 
laissez-faire approach to the marketplace of ideas has elevated 
“freedom to contract” over “free competition” and has under-
mined the very process the Court seeks to protect. 
Shifting to an attentional-choice framework might also cre-
ate space to consider how other practices—such as habit-forming 
technology and algorithmically tailored targeting—test the lim-
its of genuine attentional choice and true marketplace competi-
tion. By privileging speakers and intermediaries that have 
earned access to our attention, the Court can better serve the 
First Amendment’s dignity- and democracy-enhancing purposes, 
ground its doctrine more firmly in reality, and honor the critical 
role that we each play as producers and consumers of content in 
the marketplace of ideas. 
Part I examines the conceptual, empirical, and historical 
problems that plague the Supreme Court’s modern market met-
aphor. Part II introduces the role that attentional choice might 
play as an analytical and doctrinal device for exploring the con-
cept of competition in the marketplace of ideas. Part III revisits 
some core debates in campaign-finance law, comparing the 
Court’s treatment of expenditures under its traditional laissez-
faire model with how the Court might treat various categories of 
expenditures under an attentional-choice model. Here, I refine 
the scope and meaning of the Court’s existing “more speech” and 
“free trade” principles and explain how both public and private 
devices can interfere with free competition between ideas. Part 
IV builds on this ground and sketches out some potential areas 
for legislative intervention to promote free attentional choice 
  
 
 11. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 12. See infra Part III.B.3.i. 
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and prevent private market interference. Finally, Part V consid-
ers some of the attentional-choice theory’s practical conse-
quences in an increasingly polarized political environment.  
*    *    * 
Alexander Meiklejohn once wrote of the First Amendment, 
“What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that eve-
rything worth saying shall be said.”13 This Article offers a new 
aphorism for understanding the First Amendment in our mod-
ern information-rich and attention-scarce era: “What is essential 
is that everyone may speak, and that everything worth hearing 
can be heard.”  
I.  THE MODERN MARKET METAPHOR: RECKONING 
WITH REALITY 
A. CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS  
For much of the last century, two freedom-of-speech theories 
have animated modern First Amendment doctrine: the auton-
omy theory, which emphasizes freedom of expression, and the 
democracy theory, which emphasizes the necessity of free ex-
pression for self-government.14  
At first glance, the “marketplace of ideas” offers an elegant 
way to resolve this tension. In properly functioning economic 
markets, competition encourages decentralized producers to 
meet the needs and preferences of decentralized consumers, ide-
ally allocating scarce resources efficiently15 and driving re-
sources (and market share) to those competitors with the “best” 
goods and services (as judged by consumers).16 The aggregation 
of individual self-interested action is thought to ultimately ben-
efit society as a whole.17  
 
 13. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960). 
 14. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2000); see also Schneider v. New 
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1939); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won our independence . . . valued 
liberty both as an end and as a means.”). 
 15. See MARTIN KOLMAR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 55–82 (2017). 
 16. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 402 (4th ed. 
2018).  
 17. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 349 (1991). 
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The conceit is that a marketplace of ideas might operate in 
the same way. By staying the hand of the state and striking 
down laws that appear to impact the free flow of ideas, the Court 
believes it is providing speakers the right to introduce their 
ideas, protecting competition between those ideas within the po-
litical community, and allowing the “best” ideas to flourish for 
the benefit of individuals and society alike.18 
From the outset, however, this conceptual framework suf-
fers a fundamental problem: no one seems to know how such a 
“market” would function, what it would allocate, and why. These 
are not facetious questions. There are well-developed theories 
about how economic competition operates, how pricing signals 
drive resources, how consumer demand impacts market share, 
and how certain socially desirable benefits result.19 And, because 
we have well-developed theories about economic competition, we 
can also identify anticompetitive conduct, such as collusion20 and 
price-fixing.21  
Without an equivalent theory of ideational competition (or 
“competition between ideas”), we cannot know what a “well-func-
tioning” marketplace of ideas would look like.22 We cannot know 
what private practices might hinder competition or what public 
regulations might foster competition. And we cannot take any 
solace in the Court’s insistence that its approach “will inevitably 
produce benign results for a democratic society.”23 Instead, such 
assurances are “a matter of theoretical faith and not of empirical 
or historical observation.”24  
One initial puzzle is where competition occurs and what that 
competition is for. Do ideas compete for acceptance in the mind 
of the listener?25 Do ideas compete for exposure across society as 
a whole?26 The Supreme Court does not definitively say.27 And 
 
 18. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).  
 19. Strauss, supra note 17. 
 20. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, ¶ 1802.  
 21. See id. ¶ 405. 
 22. Strauss, supra note 17. 
 23. TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY: MONEY IN POLITICS 
AND THE FREE MARKET CONSTITUTION 181 (2014). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 29–53. 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 54–62. 
 27. A third option between these might be “the social aggregate of 
[knowledge] possession.” Alvin I. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and 
the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1, 5 (1996). 
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while the Court seems to recognize that these two planes of com-
petition intersect,28 it offers no account as to how or why. What 
is the market mechanism? By what means do consumer judg-
ments feed back into (and thereby shape) the allocation of “mar-
ket share” among “producers”?  
1. Competition for Individual Acceptance  
At times, the Court and commentators portray the market-
place of ideas as a competition for acceptance, with the battle 
between ideas occurring within the mind of the individual: dif-
fering facts and opinions competing for one’s approval.29 Take 
the counterspeech rationale, for example: true and false infor-
mation are both provided, and the person confronted with the 
“competing” information is expected to decide which is more com-
pelling.30 
Putting aside for the moment whether the individual is ac-
tually likely to believe the “true” information in such a situa-
tion,31 the scenario immediately raises some fundamental con-
ceptual problems. To start, the individual must be confronted 
with (at least) two conflicting pieces of information for there to 
be any competition at all. More importantly, as we move away 
from this clean, unrealistic, binary proposition and towards a 
more messy, realistic argument involving various gradations 
and permutations, the idea that an individual can or should act 
as the clearinghouse for resolving every argument quickly col-
lapses. After all, scholars may devote their entire lives to exam-
ining a single issue and fail to read every work bearing on it. No 
 
 28. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 
721, 747 (2011) (“All else being equal, an advertisement supporting the election 
of a candidate that goes without a response is often more effective than an ad-
vertisement that is directly controverted.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945); Goldman & Cox, supra note 27, at 
17 (“Only someone who accepts or believes a message should qualify as a con-
sumer of it.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied 
is more speech, not enforced silence.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 
355 (2010) (“Factions should be checked by permitting them all to speak . . . and 
by entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.”). 
 31. See infra Part I.B. 
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person can resolve all ideational competitions,32 and any attempt 
to do so would be, itself, irrational.33 
This quandary raises three dynamics that any “marketplace 
of ideas” would seemingly need to recognize and reconcile. First, 
persuasion is in part a function of exposure. Second, each indi-
vidual has limited time for this exposure. And third, every indi-
vidual lives in a mediated informational ecosystem in which 
one’s exposure depends in part on the choices of other actors. 
While each of these observations may seem obvious,34 the Court 
has never truly grappled with their implications for the market-
place of ideas.  
First. Both the conservative and liberal wings of the Court 
have recognized at various points that persuasion is intimately 
related with exposure. In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Free-
dom Club PAC v. Bennett, for example, Chief Justice Roberts ob-
served that “[a]ll else being equal, an advertisement supporting 
the election of a candidate that goes without a response is often 
more effective than an advertisement that is directly contro-
verted.”35 As Roberts recognizes, the greater the societal expo-
sure, the greater likelihood that only one perspective will be 
 
 32. In philosophy, this dilemma moves us beyond “traditional epistemol-
ogy,” which views “inquiry as an activity of isolated thinkers, each pursuing 
truth in a spirit of individualism and pure self-reliance,” and towards “social 
epistemology,” which strives to “come to grips” with “the interpersonal and in-
stitutional contexts in which most knowledge endeavors are actually under-
taken.” ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD, at vii (1999). 
 33. Epistemological individualism is 
a romantic ideal which is thoroughly unrealistic and which, in practice, 
results in less rational belief and judgment. . . . I could, indeed, escape 
epistemic dependence on some experts[,] . . . [b]ut if I were to pursue 
epistemic autonomy across the board, I would succeed only in holding 
relatively uninformed, unreliable, crude, untested, and therefore irra-
tional beliefs. 
John Hardwig, Epistemic Dependence, 82 J. PHIL. 335, 340 (1985). 
 34. See id. at 336, 343 (“[B]ecause the layman is the epistemic inferior of 
the expert . . . rationality sometimes consists in refusing to think for one-
self. . . . The conclusion that it is sometimes irrational to think for oneself—that 
rationality sometimes consists in deferring to epistemic authority and, conse-
quently, in passively and uncritically accepting what we are given to believe—
will strike those wedded to epistemic individualism as odd and unacceptable, 
for it undermines their paradigm of rationality. To others, it may seem too ob-
vious for such belaboring. But in either case . . . we should recast our epistemol-
ogies and our accounts of rationality to make them congruent with this im-
portant fact of modern life.”). 
 35. 564 U.S. 721, 747 (2011). 
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heard by any given person, and the greater chance that idea will 
be “persuasive” on the individual level. 
In Citizens United, Justice Stevens makes a similar point 
about exposure and persuasion in his dissent, noting that “indi-
viduals in our society [do not have] infinite free time to listen to 
and contemplate every last bit of speech uttered by anyone,  
anywhere.”36 Instead, “the average listener’s exposure to rele-
vant viewpoints” is correlated with a speaker’s “domination of 
the airwaves prior to an election.”37 
Each of these passages acknowledges that competition for 
acceptance at the individual level depends in part on the compe-
tition for exposure at the societal level. And each—either implic-
itly or explicitly—recognizes the impact that limited time and 
mediated informational exposure has on individual persuasion.  
Second. The fact that consuming content (and producing it) 
takes time and attention is another axiom that complicates the 
Court’s modern market metaphor. Time38 and attention39 are 
scarce resources.40 Each of us has only twenty-four hours in a 
day and finite attentional capacity. Our individual choices about 
how we spend “the brutally limited resource of our attention” 
within this period—both as a speaker and a listener—powerfully 
 
 36. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 472 (2010) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
 37. Id. 
 38. ELIZABETH F. COHEN, THE POLITICAL VALUE OF TIME: CITIZENSHIP, 
DURATION, AND DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 1 (2018) (“Time is widely recognized as 
one of the most precious and finite resources required for the accomplishment 
of human purposes.”). 
 39. MATTHEW B. CRAWFORD, THE WORLD BEYOND YOUR HEAD: ON BECOM-
ING AN INDIVIDUAL IN AN AGE OF DISTRACTION 11 (2015) (“In . . . psychological 
research, attention is treated as a resource—a person has only so much of it.”). 
 40. The “scarcity rationale” articulated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), was rightfully “criticized . . . since its inception” be-
cause it viewed the scarcity of broadcasting spectrum as a reason to deviate from 
default First Amendment principles. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 638 (1994). As critics have noted, scarcity is a fact of life, and to ignore 
it is to ignore reality. See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 
501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986); John O. McGinnis, Neutral Principles and Some Cam-
paign Finance Problems, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 841, 889 (2016). That same 
logic, however, means that default First Amendment principles must account 
for scarcity, including the scarcity of our time and attention. To fail in recogniz-
ing that reality is to fall into the same trap as Red Lion (and to ignore the fun-
damental principle that drives markets, see KOLMAR, supra note 15, at 4). 
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shape our growth, self-conception, and identity.41 For “when we 
reach the end of our days, our life experience will equal what we 
have paid attention to, whether by choice or default.”42 As Jus-
tice Kennedy once wrote, “In a fleeting existence we have but 
little time to find truth through discourse.”43  
The purpose of the marketplace of ideas cannot be to “tee 
up” every potential conflict for individual resolution. That would 
be neither possible nor desirable.44 Rather, the competition for 
exposure across society must help individuals receive the infor-
mation considered most pressing, most important, most useful, 
and most credible by their own lights. 
Third. Because one’s personal exposure to information con-
stitutes only the narrowest sliver of all information available, 
this exposure necessarily depends upon intermediaries that are 
sorting, distilling, and shaping that content.45 Whether one re-
lies upon a radio station, a blog, or a friend, we all have epistemic 
dependencies.46 This is unavoidable. One cannot—simultane-
ously and in real-time—be on the ground in every warzone, in-
terview every expert in every field, review the details of every 
federal appropriation and enactment and regulation, and meet 
with every celebrity, sports star, and political figure.47  
We each make necessary but imperfect decisions about 
which intermediaries, speakers, and relationships we trust to 
 
 41. TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET IN-
SIDE OUR HEADS 7 (2016).  
 42. Id. 
 43. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 792 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 44. See supra text accompanying notes 32–34. Indeed, even if one had un-
limited time, content is created faster than any individual could consume it. By 
some estimates, over 500 hours of content are uploaded to YouTube every mi-
nute. See J. Clement, Hours of Video Uploaded to YouTube Every Minute as of 
May 2019, STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019), http://statista.com/statistics/259477/hours 
-of-video-uploaded-to-youtube-every-minute/ [https://perma.cc/44LK-MDPL]. 
 45. See GOLDMAN, supra note 32, at 104. 
 46. See Hardwig, supra note 33, at 335–36 (“The list of things I believe, 
though I have no evidence for the truth of them, is, if not infinite, virtually end-
less. . . . [Yet,] one can have good reasons for believing a proposition if one has 
good reasons to believe that others have good reasons to believe it. . . . [Such 
epistemic relationships are] essential to the scientific and scholarly pursuit of 
knowledge.”). 
 47. As of 2016, it would take 3 years, 177 days, and 10 hours to read the 
Code of Federal Regulations. Patrick McLaughlin, How Regulatory Overload 
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keep us abreast of what matters most to us.48 And because per-
suasion is so closely correlated with exposure, those who receive 
this access to our attention can exert tremendous influence over 
the selection and prioritization of content we receive, the sub-
stance of that content, and the framing of that content.49 
Taken together, these three dynamics have important im-
plications for what “competition between ideas” might mean and 
what the Court expects “competition in society” to accomplish. 
As an initial matter, one’s exposure to any given idea cannot be 
inherently good. We are constantly shifting our attention be-
tween various streams of information and cognitive tasks,50 so 
one’s exposure to any particular piece of content involves a trade-
off.  
This fact alone challenges a fundamental premise animat-
ing a great deal of First Amendment thinking. “More infor-
mation” (or “more speech”) is commonly viewed as an unqualified 
good,51 but current articulations of this principle elide the differ-
ence between the availability of more information and one’s ex-
posure to that information.52 The availability of a broad array of 
diverse opinions is a necessary predicate for competition be-
 
 48. John Hardwig, The Role of Trust in Knowledge, 88 J. PHIL. 693, 693, 
700 (1991) (“[M]ost epistemologists . . . see no role for trust in 
knowledge . . . . After all, trust, in order to be trust, must be at least partially 
blind. . . . [Yet,] [m]odern knowers cannot be independent and self-reliant, not 
even in their own fields of specialization. . . . [T]he rationality of many of our 
beliefs depends not only on our own character but on the character of others as 
well; the rationality of many of our beliefs depends on what others do and hence 
is not within our individual control.”). 
 49. See infra Part I.B. 
 50. Tim Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, 82 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 771, 781–82 (2019) (“[W]e are always processing information, or pay-
ing attention to something. . . . To allocate attention, our brain has means by 
which it decides to what streams of information, among the various choices, we 
will attend, or process.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 912–13 (1998). 
 52. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (“The policy of 
the First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion . . . .”); 
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which 
truth will ultimately prevail . . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable 
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which 
is crucial here.” (emphasis added)); see also infra Part III.B.1. 
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tween ideas to occur, but one’s exposure to any given idea is im-
plicitly assumed by the Court to be the result of the competition 
occurring between ideas within society.53  
In other words, the value we mean to protect on the individ-
ual level is the ability and freedom to receive and consider a va-
riety of views. This does not mean that any individual can or 
should receive any given piece of information. What matters are 
the terms of access to that individual’s attention: on what basis 
does this exposure to information occur?  
Consider the following opinion: anyone wearing a maroon 
shirt on a Thursday should be summarily executed. Is there 
value in allowing an individual who honestly holds this view to 
express it? Yes. Is there value to the marketplace of ideas in 
making this view available for consumption and consideration? 
Sure. But is there inherent value in everyone on earth hearing 
this view so they can decide for themselves whether it is a good 
or bad idea? Absolutely not. The very fact of hearing it means 
that individuals had to expend their time and attention on it—
time that can no longer be spent on consuming (or producing) 
more meaningful content. With so much information in existence 
competing for our attention, broad exposure to this idea would 
seem to reflect a failure in the vetting and mediating function 
the marketplace of ideas is presumed to fulfill. It is this “societal” 
competition and mediation to which we now turn. 
2. Competition for Exposure Across Society  
Beyond the competition between the merits of ideas that oc-
curs on an individual level, the Supreme Court also frequently 
conceptualizes a competition over exposure to ideas to be occur-
ring at a societal level. In such cases, the Court assumes that the 
information that gets to us—that manages to spread throughout 
society and gain access to our own informational ecosystem—is 
already a function of what people find persuasive.54 
The counterspeech rationale, for example, suggests that the 
proper “remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.”55 
This depends upon the idea that “the dynamics of free speech, of 
counterspeech, of refutation, can overcome the lie”56—that the 
 
 53. See infra text accompanying notes 54–62. 
 54. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) 
(“However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on 
the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”). 
 55. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 56. Id. at 726 (emphasis added). 
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truth will prevail “out there” in society. As Justice Brandeis once 
wrote, “If there be time to expose through discussion the false-
hood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, 
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”57  
But, again, the mere existence of true information only cre-
ates the preconditions necessary for the truth to prevail—“more 
speech” is not itself the corrective unless and until others hear 
that speech and propagate it in their own right. This competition 
for exposure throughout society is what allows the truth to “over-
come” the lie. For the person who hears only the lie, there is no 
truth.  
Putting aside (for one more moment) whether true or false 
statements are actually more likely to gain exposure in society,58 
the theoretical framework itself relies upon certain unexplained 
assumptions. How, for example, does this vital competition for 
exposure via various informational intermediaries operate?  
The Court assumes that “good ideas” rise and “bad ideas” 
fall, but given the inherent limits of time and attention (and the 
role that exposure itself is assumed to fulfill), this concept can 
only be understood in terms of relative circulation: broader ex-
posure for some ideas over time and less (or no) exposure for 
other ideas over time. To the extent content is heard at all, it 
does not expand into an empty and unclaimed space—it con-
sumes time and attention that would otherwise be directed else-
where. 
Of course, one might reasonably expect ideas deemed “good” 
to be amplified by their approval and earn wider circulation (dis-
placing other content) and ideas deemed “bad” to burn out and 
reduce in circulation (as they are replaced by other content). But 
how this critical process occurs—and what it might mean for the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence—receives remarkably 
little attention given its centrality to a meaningful account of the 
marketplace of ideas. 
After all, this process would appear to be the market mech-
anism itself: the means by which decentralized consumer judg-
ments impact the spread of information within society. If indi-
viduals comprise society, and society is expected to vet and cull 
the world’s information to help expose those same individuals to 
the highest-value information, then what individual decisions—
 
 57. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added). 
 58. See infra Part I.B.  
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what consumer choices—are driving this market-share alloca-
tion process?  
The Supreme Court’s modern market metaphor (like its 
“freedom of speech” jurisprudence more generally) focuses al-
most exclusively on the rights and roles of speakers.59 The result 
is a self-defeating doctrine: content is presumed to travel 
through society on the merits; the merits of content cannot be 
evaluated until it has been consumed by the individual; and once 
content has been consumed, the individual’s evaluation of the 
merits plays no meaningful constitutional role in the travel of 
the content.60 
In a real market, however, authority resides with consum-
ers—not producers.61 Persuasion takes two, and so it is the “au-
tonomous hearer . . . that makes free information markets pos-
sible.”62 Without any constitutional account of how an individual 
listener’s affirmation of an idea feeds back into the market and 
aids in increased societal exposure to that content, the modern 
market metaphor offers little more than an empty slogan. A 
“market” that does not attribute any significance to the decisions 
of its consumers is no market at all. 
B. EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS 
The Supreme Court is on even more treacherous terrain 
when it assumes—as a matter of fact—that truth (or “good 
ideas”) will necessarily prevail over falsity (or “bad ideas”) in the 
competition for individual acceptance or in the competition for 
exposure within society. According to the intuition behind the 
Court’s counterspeech rationale: “The remedy for speech that is 
false is speech that is true. . . . The response to the unreasoned 
is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the 
straight-out lie, the simple truth.”63  
 
 59. See BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 99–100 (2015). 
 60. See Goldman & Cox, supra note 27, at 26–27 (observing that, in the 
Court’s current conception of the marketplace, “there is no difference in pay-
ment between viewers who ‘consume’ [a] message and those who do not”; indeed, 
“there seems to be no ‘exchange’ or ‘trade’ at all”). 
 61. See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 41 (2005). 
 62. Burt Neuborne, The Status of the Hearer in Mr. Madison’s Neighbor-
hood, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 897, 901 (2017). 
 63. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
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The cruel irony is that this presumption is precisely the kind 
of “false,” “unreasoned,” and “uninformed” folklore that has sur-
vived repeated combat with all contrary evidence. The world 
does not consist of purely rational atomistic actors. Humans rely 
on cognitive shortcuts and social cues to triage the information 
around them and allocate what limited attention they have 
available.64 In fact, the Court’s language above employs classic 
rhetorical devices—repetition and antithesis—that are known to 
“create the illusion of rationality” by “turning something ques-
tionable into something catchy.”65 If you felt seduced by the 
Court’s powerful rhetoric, you’re not alone. 
The Court’s current doctrine and implicit theory of demo-
cratic behavior romanticize individual political action and rest 
upon wildly outdated assumptions.66 In the Court’s view, per-
sonal preferences arise spontaneously and are taken as given 
while social groups play no apparent role.67 This view “is like the 
ether theory of electromagnetic and gravitational forces: it is 
based on nineteenth-century intellectual foundations, and the 
empirical evidence has passed it by.”68 
Neuroscience shows that emotions and intuitions are an in-
herent part of our reasoning process.69 While most First Amend-
ment theories rely on a dichotomy between reason and emo-
tion,70 this contrast turns out to be “as pointless as contrasting 
rain with weather, or cars with vehicles.”71 Cognition simply re-
 
 64. See infra text accompanying notes 69–96. 
 65. See DEREK THOMPSON, HIT MAKERS: THE SCIENCE OF POPULARITY IN 
AN AGE OF DISTRACTION 89–94 (2017). 
 66. See Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmenta-
tion, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 815 (2014). 
 67. See CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR 
REALISTS: WHY ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 225 
(2016).  
 68. Id. at 299. 
 69. See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE 
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 33–34 (2012) (discussing the difficulties in 
decision-making experienced by patients who largely lack emotion due to dam-
age to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex). 
 70. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 62, at 904–05 (stating that a “romanti-
cally optimistic” view of the citizen as a “rational, freestanding, trustworthy, 
and autonomous hearer” may not be an “accurate vision” but is considered “cen-
tral to the operation of robust democracies, efficient markets, and free socie-
ties”). 
 71. HAIDT, supra note 69, at 45. 
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fers to information processing, and emotions fall within this cat-
egory.72 Emotion plays a critical role in our reception to and en-
coding of new information. Emotion can trigger our attention, 
meter how much attention we provide to new information, and 
assign meaning and value to that information.73 Before we even 
begin conscious thought, our brain has placed incoming infor-
mation in a positive or negative context.74  
We also now know that social groups powerfully shape our 
preferences,75 and that cognitive shortcuts impact our decision-
making and information-processing patterns.76 “A vast body of 
sociological and political scientific research demonstrates that 
relationships, far more than ideological commitments, drive po-
litical mobilization, organization, and information transmis-
sion.”77 Indeed, reasoning itself may have evolved “not to help us 
find truth but to help us engage in arguments, persuasion, and 
manipulation in the context of discussions with other people.”78 
This is not to deny the existence of methods for challenging 
our instincts or the value in making more space for higher-order 
reasoning to occur.79 But information transfer is inherently emo-
tional, social, and contextual; we cannot exchange content in a 
way neutral to our own identities or independent of how we sit-
uate ourselves in the world. Our “political preferences and gen-
eral cultural tastes . . . have their origin in ethnic, sectional, 
class, and family traditions,”80 and these influences shape our 
 
 72. See id. at 44–45. 
 73. See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 43, 372 (1997); DAN-
IEL J. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND: TOWARD A NEUROBIOLOGY OF INTERPER-
SONAL EXPERIENCE 123, 126, 131, 135, 159 (1999); ROBERT SYLWESTER, A BIO-
LOGICAL BRAIN IN A CULTURAL CLASSROOM 37, 39 (2d ed. 2003). 
 74. See HAIDT, supra note 69, at 64–65. 
 75. See generally ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67. 
 76. See S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting 
the Challenge, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 140 (2017) (describing examples 
of cognitive shortcuts, including “positive illusions, hindsight bias, contrast 
bias, procrastination bias, omission bias, normality bias, and the status quo 
bias”). 
 77. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Networking the Party: First Amendment Rights 
and the Pursuit of Responsive Party Government, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1225, 
1232 (2018). 
 78. HAIDT, supra note 69, at 89. 
 79. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
 80. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 232 (quoting BERNARD BERELSON 
ET AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 
311 (1954)). 
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perceptions, not just of opinions or issues but also of “simple 
facts.”81  
This challenges one of the Court’s core articles of faith: that 
when “True” and “False” information come into conflict, “Truth” 
will win. Emotional appeals,82 framing devices,83 and verbal pat-
terning tricks (such as the one used by the Court above)84 allow 
those with access to our attention to shape our attitudes in pro-
found ways. For example, the “repetition of a phrase or idea, even 
one labeled false, might confuse many people in the long run, be-
cause it is so easy to conflate familiarity with truth.”85 This 
“mere exposure effect”—where the brain labels familiar things 
as good—is a basic principle of advertising.86  
Nor does information necessarily spread throughout society 
or gain exposure based on whether it is “true” or “good” by any 
objective measure. As discussed above, epistemic dependency is 
a constant feature of our individual information ecosystems, and 
this means it can be rational for “people [to] stop paying atten-
tion to their own information and look to what others know.”87 
Although this can sometimes run rampant—leading to “infor-
mation cascades”88—the human tendency to rely on others’ 
knowledge is natural, unavoidable, and a core feature of modern 
information markets. It is neither inherently good nor inherently 
bad. Information cascades can bring social movements to life and 
 
 81. Id. at 231. 
 82. See THOMPSON, supra note 65, at 89–94; Stanley Ingber, The Market-
place of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 35–36 (1984). 
 83. See Robert M. Entman & Nikki Usher, Framing in a Fractured Democ-
racy: Impacts of Digital Technology on Ideology, Power and Cascading Network 
Activation, 68 J. COMM. 298, 299 (2018) (“[F]raming connects on a fundamental 
level to the core processes of communication.”). For example, in the 1970s “al-
most half of Americans said they would ‘not allow’ a communist to give a speech, 
while only about one-fourth said they would ‘forbid’ him or her from doing so.” 
ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 31.  
 84. Verbal patterns—epistrophe, anaphora, tricolon, epizeuxis, diacope, 
antithesis, parallelism, anti-metabole—can create a “rhyme-as-reason” effect. 
In short, such “musical language” can “create the illusion of rationality,” even 
if the underlying content is patently wrong. THOMPSON, supra note 65, at 89–
93. 
 85. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).  
 86. HAIDT, supra note 69, at 65. 
 87. Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge 
for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1765 
(2019). 
 88. Id. 
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abuses of power to light.89 Information cascades can also spread 
lies and outrage like wildfire.90  
The reality is that mistaken beliefs can persist (and even 
strengthen or re-emerge) over long periods of time.91 The theory 
that the marketplace of ideas necessarily functions as an “engine 
of truth production” is simply false.92 Political preferences in par-
ticular “are relatively invulnerable to direct argumentation.”93 
In fact, exposure to accurate information can backfire and 
strengthen political misperceptions.94 And learning about others’ 
political views can reduce one’s ability to assess and use their 
expertise in nonpolitical domains.95 Information does not exist 
in a vacuum and neither do we; when forced to choose between 
an abstract notion of accuracy or one’s own sense of self and so-
cial belonging, we often favor the latter.96 
To be clear, none of this necessitates the Supreme Court 
abandon a market-based conceptual framework altogether. 
There are compelling reasons to jettison such an approach,97 but 
that is not my purpose in confronting the Court’s fictions. When 
 
 89. See id. (“Social movements have leveraged the power of information cas-
cades, including Black Lives Matter activists and the Never Again movement of 
the Parkland High School students. Arab Spring protesters spread videos and 
photographs of police torture.”). 
 90. See infra text accompanying notes 253–56 (observing studies that 
demonstrate falsity can outpace truth on social media platforms). 
 91. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 277.  
 92. TERESA M. BEJAN, MERE CIVILITY: DISAGREEMENT AND THE LIMITS OF 
TOLERATION 139 (2017). 
 93. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 232 (quoting BERELSON ET AL., 
supra note 80, at 311). 
 94. See HAIDT, supra note 69, at 48 (“[Y]ou can’t change people’s minds by 
utterly refuting their arguments.”); Strong, supra note 76, at 138–39. But see 
Brendan Nyhan et al., Taking Fact-Checks Literally but Not Seriously? The Ef-
fects of Journalistic Fact-Checking on Factual Beliefs and Candidate Favorabil-
ity, POL. BEHAV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 26), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2995128 (finding “little evidence” of “backfire effect” in research and suggesting 
that motivated reasoning might coexist with belief updating). 
 95. See generally Joseph Marks et al., Epistemic Spillovers: Learning Oth-
ers’ Political Views Reduces the Ability To Assess and Use Their Expertise in 
Nonpolitical Domains, 188 COGNITION 74 (2019). 
 96. See HAIDT, supra note 69, at 83. 
 97. See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amend-
ment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2119, 2123 (2019) (discussing how the shift 
towards “a highly formal conception of the First Amendment’s equality guaran-
tee”—i.e., a “right to speak on equal terms as other speakers”—entrenches ex-
isting social and political hierarchies). 
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the role of social institutions and the routine frictions of ex-
change became clearer over time, both philosophers98 and econ-
omists99 engaged with the implications for their fields and ad-
justed course. Then, as the science around biases and cognition 
became clearer, the study of “behavioral economics” emerged to 
incorporate additional insights and to deepen and complicate 
economic study.100 All of society’s institutions have adapted to 
reality but one: “free speech [remains] ‘the only area where lais-
sez-faire is still respectable.’”101 In the name of truth and reason, 
the Supreme Court continues to ignore both.  
But the Court can acknowledge the limitations of its doc-
trine without abandoning its entire jurisprudence. The behav-
ioral insights above should encourage the Court to stop relying 
upon proven falsehoods to prop up a doctrine that fails to “com-
port with the reality of everyday life.”102 For “[i]f that is the 
law, . . . ‘the law is a ass—a idiot.’”103 
C. HISTORICAL PROBLEMS 
In light of the market metaphor’s faults, a supporter of the 
doctrine might seek refuge in its purportedly long pedigree. Yet, 
here too the story that the Supreme Court tells is more charita-
ble than history suggests.  
As Professor Jud Campbell reveals in his important and 
comprehensive accounting of the First Amendment’s meaning at 
the time of the Founding, our modern debates emphasizing “re-
 
 98. See Goldman & Cox, supra note 27, at 2 (“[S]ocial epistemology focuses 
on public and institutional practices that can foster the acquisition of knowledge 
or information. . . . Among the social practices of interest are practices of speech 
and communication, through which knowledge (and also error) can be transmit-
ted from agent to agent.”). 
 99. See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 821, 825–27 (2008); R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 
82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 714 (1992) (“[The neoclassical economy] lives in the 
minds of economists but not on earth.”). 
 100. See generally FLORIS HEUKELOM, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: A HISTORY 
(2014). 
 101. R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. 
ECON. REV. 384, 385 (1974) (quoting Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic 
Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 5 (1964)). 
 102. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1681 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. (quoting C. DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 277 (1867)). 
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publican government,” “the marketplace of ideas,” or “the auton-
omy of individuals” are just that: modern.104 The First Amend-
ment did not reflect any of these particular rationales when it 
was adopted.105 Instead, the First Amendment reflected the 
dominant paradigm of an earlier era: the distinction between 
natural rights and positive rights.106 Our contemporary legal de-
bates about the appropriate scope, structure, and application of 
the First Amendment—and how these align with autonomy, self-
governance, or the marketplace of ideas—remain important, but 
whatever doctrine results must sit on its own bottom.107 
If anything, James Madison (the principal drafter of the 
First Amendment)108 and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (the intel-
lectual father of the “marketplace of ideas”)109 might be among 
those most surprised by the Court’s modern doctrine. Madison 
understood well the powerful role that groups, identities, and 
emotions play in driving political activity.110 “So strong is this 
propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities,” Madison 
wrote, that “the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have 
been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite 
their most violent conflicts.”111 Nor did Madison believe in ster-
ling reason or the inevitability of true and good ideas prevailing: 
“As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at lib-
erty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed.”112  
The Constitution cannot be understood apart from the view 
of human nature that inspired it. Early Enlightenment thinkers 
“diagnosed partiality and pride as the psychological factors” be-
 
 104. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE 
L.J. 246, 262 (2017). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 251–52. 
 107. See id. at 318 (“[T]he history of speech and press freedoms overwhelm-
ingly disproves the Supreme Court’s insistence that modern doctrines inhere in 
the Speech Clause itself . . . .”). 
 108. Although Madison was not singularly responsible for the precise phras-
ing and structure of the First Amendment, he was its chief architect. See 
NEUBORNE, supra note 59, at 1. 
 109. Although Holmes did not coin the precise phrase “marketplace of ideas,” 
the First Amendment metaphor derives from his Abrams dissent. See Blasi, su-
pra note 61, at 24 n.80. 
 110. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 215. 
 111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
2003). 
 112. Id. at 78. 
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hind the religious conflicts that roiled seventeenth century Eu-
rope.113 Drawing from their lessons, Madison likewise viewed 
such “latent causes of faction” as being “sown in the nature of 
man.”114 The goal of the Constitution was not to change or ignore 
these innate tendencies, but to design institutions that could an-
ticipate and account for them.115 As Madison pondered, “what is 
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human 
nature?”116 
The Court, in construing Madison’s words, must be wary of 
any interpretation “that presuppose[s] a radical change in hu-
man nature.”117 Humans are not “detached, cool, rational” beings 
with “a tremendous capacity to process and contextualize infor-
mation from any source.”118 The Court’s interpretation of the 
First Amendment should recognize that reality and account for 
it.119 
The “free trade in ideas” envisioned by Justice Holmes was 
similarly built on a more sober view of human nature and de-
mocracy.120 Holmes (like Madison) recognized that our beliefs 
are profoundly shaped by our associations and social identities, 
noting that “[m]ost of the things we do, we do for no better reason 
than that our fathers have done them or that our neighbors do 
them.”121  
In an article published just before his famous Abrams dis-
sent, Holmes reflected, “What we most love and revere generally 
is determined by early associations. I love granite rocks and bar-
berry bushes, no doubt because with them were my earliest 
 
 113. BEJAN, supra note 92, at 165. 
 114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 111, at 79. 
 115. Id. at 75 (“[T]he causes of faction cannot be removed . . . relief is only to 
be sought in the means of controlling its effects.”). 
 116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
2003). 
 117. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 10 (quoting A. LAWRENCE LOW-
ELL, PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT 233 (1913)).  
 118. Jacob Eisler, The Deep Patterns of Campaign Finance Law, 49 CONN. 
L. REV. 55, 91 (2016). 
 119. See Ortiz, supra note 51, at 896–97 (“[D]emocratic theory is, in some 
deep sense, utopian . . . . [W]e should stop pretending [and] design institutional 
structures . . . to overcome, not ignore, our weaknesses.”). 
 120. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). 
 121. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
468 (1897).  
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joys . . . .”122 Yet Holmes knew these origins of identity could be 
cause for both pride and restraint: “[W]hile one’s experience thus 
makes certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of 
how they came to be so leaves one able to see that others, poor 
souls, may be equally dogmatic about something else.”123  
Holmes’s analogies in Abrams echo this lesson: “If you have 
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain re-
sult with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law 
and sweep away all opposition.”124 With a “prudence born of ex-
perience,”125 however, the First Amendment intervenes. “[W]hen 
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas . . . .”126 
According to Holmes, the purpose of the marketplace is not 
to collectively find one true faith but to allow all “to speak freely 
and . . . win converts to their cause.”127 The concept respects our 
unavoidable differences and recognizes that our mutual path for-
ward must be cleared by those ideas that gather widespread as-
sent across and between different communities through dialogue 
and conversation: “the best test of truth is the power of [a] 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, 
and that truth is the only ground upon which [our] wishes safely 
can be carried out.”128 Not “Truth” in a Platonic sense, but truth 
about our place in the world—our notion of self, our role in the 
community, and our vision of the highest good.129 
 
 122. Blasi, supra note 61, at 14 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural 
Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 125. Blasi, supra note 61, at 3. 
 126. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 127. BEJAN, supra note 92, at 173. 
 128. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 129. Holmes appears to have drawn some of his Abrams references from 
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, which Holmes had re-read in early 1919. See 
Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart 
Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 35, 37–38 (2010). Nonetheless, the “marketplace” envisioned by 
Holmes seems to diverge from Mill’s in key respects. Mill viewed “the truth-
seeking enterprise as a search for objective, universal truths.” Id. at 61. Holmes 
free-speech defense, on the other hand, “appears to be more pragmatic, consist-
ing of choices made by sufficiently interested majorities or dominant groups.” 
Id. 
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Holmes himself did not believe our destination was certain 
or that “Truth” with a capital T would prevail. Holmes “detested 
absolutism.”130 Years earlier, he observed that while the logical 
form of the law “flatter[s] that longing for certainty and for re-
pose which is in every human mind,” the reality is more compli-
cated: “certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the des-
tiny of man.”131 In Abrams too, Holmes calls the “theory of our 
Constitution . . . an experiment, as all life is an experiment” and, 
with an unflinching flourish, writes that “every day we have to 
wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect 
knowledge.”132 
In this telling, the marketplace of ideas serves a more lim-
ited function: respecting individual difference while gauging col-
lective agreement. Rather than promoting the “best” idea in 
some abstract or absolute sense, the market promotes those 
ideas that are “best” at gaining the interest and attention of lis-
teners based on those consumers’ own choices and preferences. 
For only those ideas that have gained widespread assent are the 
“ground upon which [our] wishes safely can be carried out.”133 
From this modest starting point, a more conceptually, em-
pirically, and historically grounded theory of ideational competi-
tion seems possible; a theory that reckons with the reality of how 
ideas travel in society and how humans engage with them.  
II.  ATTENTIONAL CHOICE: A THEORY OF COMPETITION 
FOR THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS   
Absent from the Supreme Court’s theory of competition be-
tween ideas is the central role of human attention: the terms of 
access to our attention, the choices we make about where to di-
rect our attention, and how our attentional choices influence 
which ideas spread throughout society. So long as the market-
place of ideas remains a fixture of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, attention would seem to provide a more meaningful, co-
herent, and realistic account of what a marketplace of ideas is, 
 
  Of course, one need not reject the existence of “Truth” to believe there 
is unacceptable danger in letting the government decide what is and is not ac-
ceptable speech. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (2019) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 130. Ten Cate, supra note 129, at 48; see also Blasi, supra note 61, at 14. 
 131. Holmes, supra note 121, at 465. 
 132. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. 
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how it might function, and what it should be expected to accom-
plish. Attention offers a way for judicial doctrine to take account 
of how ideas are produced, consumed, and considered in the real 
world.134 Finally, attention may offer a lens through which we 
can re-examine the proper scope of the judicial role—and the per-
missible scope of legislative intervention—in a more nuanced 
and principled way.135 
As a matter of First Amendment theory, attentional choices 
could operate as the missing market mechanism at the heart of 
the marketplace of ideas: the link between our decentralized de-
cisions as consumers of ideas about their value and the mediat-
ing function that we are expected to play in deciding what de-
serves further exposure in society.  
Because our time is limited and each of us necessarily de-
pends upon the culling and framing of intermediaries,136 we 
must make educated guesses about which sources to attend to 
based on past experience, trust, reputation, and other indicia of 
reliability and relevance (such as the recommendation of a friend 
or the validation of a source within one’s social groups). Over 
time, we adjust which relationships and sources we rely upon as 
our faith is either rewarded or betrayed. 
Centering attentional decisions in this way explains how in-
dividual evaluations about ideational worth influence our own 
future exposure, reward speakers and intermediaries who pro-
vide consistently valuable content, and guide other consumers 
towards content worthy of their own attention. 
Perhaps one might ask why individuals cannot judge for 
themselves and consider the value of each bit of content on its 
own merits. For the reasons described in Part I, this chestnut of 
modern marketplace reasoning fails to recognize the fundamen-
tal limitations of time and the vetting role that society must play 
both as a matter of practical reality and conceptual con-
sistency.137 One cannot evaluate the merits of content until it 
has been consumed—at which point, one’s time and attention 
has already been spent. If the consumer’s assessment of value is 
to flow back into the market, that signal depends on what the 
consumer does next: Listen to the speaker’s next podcast epi-
sode? Forward the content to a friend? These are the signals of 
 
 134. See infra Part III. 
 135. See infra Part IV. 
 136. See supra Part I.A. 
 137. See supra Part I.A. 
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ideational value that cause speakers, intermediaries, and con-
tent to gain or maintain exposure over time.138  
This description of mediated information environments and 
attentional decisions based on trust may strike some as odd or 
even unsettling.139 We do not often consider how tenuous, so-
cially contingent, and faith-based our information consumption 
is. And yet, it is. How do you choose a book to read before you 
read it? On what basis do you decide to read an article? Con-
sumption decisions about content must, by their very nature, be 
made prior to that consumption. Even tuning into your favorite 
news program in the morning or logging on to your favorite social 
media site reflects an act of trust in an ongoing relationship: 
trust that your chosen intermediary remains a dependable 
source of worthwhile information. Our assessments of these ex-
periences then inform our own future consumption patterns and 
provide a proxy for quality that is relied upon by others. 
The significance of such relationships to our own exposure 
may be uncomfortable to confront, but “every day we have to wa-
ger our salvation . . . based upon imperfect knowledge.”140 Infor-
mation is constantly sifted, weighed, distilled, and sorted before 
we receive it.  
Reorganizing the theory of “competition between ideas” 
around the role of attention also provides a conceptual frame-
work for incorporating behavioral and psychological insights. 
Rather than expecting rational beings to make “correct” choices, 
an attentional theory of competition takes us as we are: diverse, 
emotional, and social beings that rely on a range of cognitive 
shortcuts and relational indicators to process the information 
around us and share it with others.141 Just as participants in the 
economic market rely upon signaling information and context to 
guide their decisions (and may not make perfectly rational deci-
sions), participants in the ideational market draw upon contex-
tual signals to allocate their time and decide what deserves their 
attention. 
 
 138. Or, if the individual’s initial experience was more than enough, that 
assessment will be reflected in diminished future exposure—with the less valu-
able and less relevant being culled. 
 139. See Hardwig, supra note 33, at 349 (“[I]t is also deeply disturbing be-
cause it reveals the extent to which . . . our rationality rests on trust.”).   
 140. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). 
 141. See supra Part I.B. 
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Building doctrine around a conceptual touchstone like free 
attentional choice preserves space for the law to adapt to evolv-
ing empirical understandings about how our attention is earned 
and how it might be abused. In other words, incorporating in-
sights from psychology, neuroscience, political science, and polit-
ical communications to inform how our attentional choices un-
fold in reality is not “anti-market,” it is “more accurate 
market.”142  
If the marketplace of ideas is going to bear the substantial 
doctrinal weight that the Supreme Court continues to place upon 
it, then reexamining the concept’s scope and application through 
the lens of attentional choice may provide a promising ap-
proach—or at least a step in the right direction. Our individual-
ized and decentralized assessments about what deserves atten-
tion are, arguably, the way in which value is conferred in the 
marketplace of ideas and the point at which consumer choices 
enter the picture. Yet, current doctrine fails to accord any con-
stitutional significance to these decisions.  
Incorporating the role that attentional choice plays might 
avoid the most glaring conceptual, empirical, and historical 
shortcomings of the modern market metaphor, while retaining 
its most salient features: “nonprescriptively honoring and imple-
menting preferences and judgments,” “reward[ing] participants 
who generate and master pertinent information,” “respond[ing] 
to changing conditions and lessons learned,” and “encourag[ing] 
prudent risk-taking [by] punish[ing] both excessive caution and 
reckless undertakings.”143 Most importantly, such an approach 
ensures sovereignty remains with the people, with citizens free 
to set—and reset—the public agenda.144 
III.  EARNING ACCESS TO ATTENTION: REVISITING THE 
ROLE(S) OF EXPENDITURES IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
DOCTRINE 
Reconceptualizing the marketplace of ideas as a competition 
for attention could have profound implications for campaign-fi-
nance doctrine, commercial-speech doctrine,145 and a number of 
other areas of First Amendment law. For campaign-finance law 
 
 142. See supra text accompanying notes 97–101. 
 143. Vincent A. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule at the Birth of 
the Modern First Amendment, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 13, 22–23 (Lee C. 
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019). 
 144. OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 23 (1996). 
 145. See infra note 317. 
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in particular, an attentional-choice approach offers a basis for 
revisiting and complicating some of the fundamental pillars of 
the debate: the uniform treatment of “money” as “speech,” the 
centrality of the distinction between contributions and expendi-
tures, and the reigning paradigms of “preventing corruption” 
and “promoting political equality.” 
Whereas the Supreme Court’s traditional laissez-faire ap-
proach invalidates laws based on the vague concept of protecting 
the “free flow of information” in society, an attentional-choice ap-
proach recognizes that exposure should turn on consumer valu-
ation and that unequal terms of access to attention have the po-
tential to undermine the competitive operation of the 
marketplace of ideas. Just as some agreements advance compe-
tition while others undermine competition in the economic mar-
ketplace, so too can some expenditures advance competition 
while others undermine competition in the ideational market-
place. 
Recognizing that different types of expenditures can have 
different competitive impacts also reveals that both conserva-
tives and liberals in the campaign-finance debate have fair intu-
itions (in part) about the “distorting” effects of government reg-
ulation and money, respectively. Caps by the government on 
certain categories of expenditures may constrain free entry into 
and free competition within the marketplace of ideas. Unlimited 
spending by private actors on other categories of expenditures 
may undermine free competition within the marketplace of ideas 
by increasing societal exposure in a way divorced from consumer 
valuation and validation.  
Rather than assuming that a laissez-faire approach will re-
sult in a competitive marketplace of ideas, an attentional-choice 
theory interrogates the terms upon which attention has been at-
tained to determine whether it has been earned through compe-
tition. This also provides a new basis for government interven-
tion: protecting competition and preventing anticompetitive 
conduct.  
In Section A, I provide a brief overview of the campaign-fi-
nance debates to date under the Supreme Court’s modern mar-
ketplace metaphor (known as the “laissez-faire” model) and dis-
cuss some of the challenges raised in these debates.  
In Section B, I describe how one might approach campaign-
finance questions under the attentional-choice model instead. To 
start, this involves refining and clarifying the meaning and lim-
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its of the “more speech” and “free trade” principles commonly in-
voked by the Supreme Court. These principles reasonably extend 
First Amendment protection to certain categories of expendi-
tures that facilitate the production, distribution, and availability 
of content. Yet, the attentional-choice lens also brings into focus 
the ways in which both private action and government action can 
restrain free competition in the marketplace of ideas. This dis-
cussion clears the way for more tailored government regulations 
to promote free competition by protecting attentional choice and 
curbing private restraints of trade.  
A. CAMPAIGN FINANCE UNDER THE “LAISSEZ-FAIRE” MODEL 
Growing out of the industrial expansion that followed the 
Civil War and its attendant concentration of wealth, many 
Americans developed the “popular feeling that aggregated capi-
tal unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of 
corruption.”146 Starting with a prohibition on corporate contribu-
tions to candidates in 1907,147 extending to encompass expendi-
tures on behalf of candidates in 1947,148 and culminating in the 
Federal Election Campaigns Act (FECA) and its amendments in 
the 1970s,149 the nation’s campaign finance laws gradually ex-
panded in their reach, covering more and more uses of money to 
influence the political process. 
Then came Buckley v. Valeo.150 In 1976, a fractured Su-
preme Court broke the legislative framework into pieces. In 
Buckley, the Court rejected any purported government interest 
“in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to 
influence the outcome of elections,”151 calling “the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our so-
ciety in order to enhance the relative voice of others . . . wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment.”152 On the other hand, the 
Court validated the government’s interest in preventing corrup-
tion153 but distinguished between FECA’s limits on contributions 
directly to candidates (which were deemed sufficiently tailored 
to preventing corruption) and the law’s limits on “independent 
 
 146. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957). 
 147. Id. at 575. 
 148. Id. at 581–82 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-2739, at 36–37, 40 (1946)). 
 149. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982). 
 150. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 151. Id. at 48–49. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 45–49. 
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expenditures” on behalf of candidates (which were deemed insuf-
ficiently tailored to preventing corruption).154  
To this day, campaign finance doctrine and debates continue 
to play out in the shadow of the two paradigms set out in Buck-
ley: whether a legislative restriction targets “expenditures” or 
“contributions”155 and whether the government may target “cor-
ruption” or pursue “political equality.”156 These conceptual cate-
gories offer little room for new or meaningful developments,157 
and take as their starting point the Supreme Court’s conceptu-
ally flawed marketplace of ideas.  
The contemporary “corruption” interest, for example, pro-
vides a narrow exception from modern marketplace treatment, 
but the scope of what it can justify is highly circumscribed. In 
Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that the government 
could only enact laws to prevent quid pro quo corruption (or the 
 
 154. Id. at 23–29, 45–48. 
 155. Fewer lines in constitutional law have “been subjected to more wither-
ing criticism over the years than Buckley’s expenditure/contribution distinc-
tion.” Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democ-
racy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 747 (2007). Both liberal and conservative Justices 
have expressed an interest in abandoning the distinction. See FEC v. Beaumont, 
539 U.S. 146, 164 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Were we presented with a 
case in which the distinction between contributions and expenditures under the 
whole scheme of campaign finance regulation were under review, I might join 
Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion.”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 
377, 412 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting; Scalia, J., joining) (“The analytic foun-
dation of Buckley . . . was tenuous from the very beginning and has only contin-
ued to erode in the intervening years.”); id. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring; Gins-
burg, J., joining) (suggesting that the Court might “reinterpret aspects of 
Buckley” and “mak[e] less absolute the contribution/expenditure line”). Alt-
hough there may be reasons for treating contributions directly to campaigns 
differently than contributions to independent organizations from a corruption 
standpoint, contributions and expenditures are, generally speaking, “‘two sides 
of the same First Amendment coin,’ and [the] Court’s efforts to distinguish the 
two have produced mere ‘word games’ rather than any cognizable constitutional 
law principle.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 189 (2014) (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 241, 244 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
 156. See Karlan, supra note 155, at 747, 751. 
 157. See Daniel P. Tokaji & Renata E.B. Strause, How Sausage Is Made: A 
Research Agenda for Campaign Finance and Lobbying, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 223, 228 (2016) (“The anticorruption-versus-equality debate has effec-
tively reached its conclusion, at least as an academic matter.”); Bob Bauer, Un-
desirable Alternatives, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD L. (May 11, 2016), http://www 
.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2016/05/undesirable-alternatives/ [https://perma 
.cc/PKP6-KHX2] (referring to “the bitter, stalemated discussion of campaign fi-
nance policy”). 
  
2020] FIGHTING FOR ATTENTION 2187 
 
appearance of such corruption)—it could not prohibit expendi-
tures just because they might curry favor, access, or influence.158  
Quite (in)famously, Citizens United claimed as a matter of 
law that “[t]he appearance of influence or access . . . will not 
cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”159 Once this 
form of corruption has been defined out of the way and only quid 
pro quo corruption remains, the scope of permissible government 
intervention shrinks dramatically. There is little evidence of the 
kind of “vote buying” that forms the central concern of quid pro 
quo corruption.160 Actual bribery is vanishingly rare.”161 And 
while “much of what politicians and benefactors now do in the 
regulatory system crafted by the Supreme Court actually does 
appear to be quid pro quo corruption” to the average citizen,162 
some election-law scholars expect doctrine to continue moving in 
a deregulatory direction.163  
A corruption-centered framework also provides a poor fit for 
dynamics that voters find problematic on other grounds. In May 
2016, for example, the eighty-three-year-old father of a Califor-
nia congressman pleaded guilty “to funneling more than a quar-
ter of a million dollars to his son’s campaigns in 2010 and 
2012.”164 Prosecutors sought a thirty-month prison term.165 
While there are good reasons to limit such behavior, “preventing 
corruption” would not seem to be one of them. There is little risk 
that the father was attempting to buy off his own son. The same 
could be said of spending by self-funded candidates and spending 
 
 158. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–60 (2010). 
 159. Id. at 360. 
 160. See Christopher Robertson et al., The Appearance and the Reality of 
Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
375, 412 (2016). 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. at 380. 
 163. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Unlimited Donations to Candidates, Com-
ing Soon?, ATLANTIC (July 26, 2019), http://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 
2019/07/campaign-finance-supreme-court/594751/ [https://perma.cc/FCT4 
-UPL9]. 
 164. John Myers, ‘I Have, in Fact, Done the Crime’: Rep. Ami Bera’s Father 
Admits Illegal Campaign Contributions, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2016), https:// 
www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-ami-bera-father-campaign-money 
-20160510-story.html [https://perma.cc/KP95-FKA4]. 
 165. Id. 
  
2188 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2157 
 
by interest groups intended to influence public opinion on initi-
atives, referenda, and ballot questions.166 
The debate over the political equality interest, on the other 
hand, splits three ways—all of which take the Supreme Court’s 
modern market metaphor as their starting point for debate. On 
one side are “libertarian” advocates167 who (along with a current 
majority on the Supreme Court)168 continue to subscribe to the 
modern market metaphor despite its conceptual incoherence, 
unproven assumptions, and empirical errors.  
For market libertarians, the metaphor operates as a kind of 
laissez-faire shorthand: government regulations distort the free 
flow of information; the free flow of information is necessary for 
the market to function; therefore, government regulations vio-
late the First Amendment. The political equality interest in par-
ticular is considered anathema to market ordering—a blatant 
attempt by the government to “tilt public debate in a preferred 
direction” by picking winners and losers.169 
On the other side are “interventionist” advocates170 who be-
lieve the government should be able to pursue an interest in po-
litical equality. Some observe that the modern market metaphor 
is significantly flawed171 and advocate for abandoning the model 
in favor of a more explicit balancing between equality and lib-
erty; others (perhaps recognizing the metaphor’s staying power) 
work within its parameters, arguing that media consolidation 
 
 166. See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 n.7 (1982) 
(“[I]n elections of candidates to public office, unlike in referenda on issues of 
general public interest, there may well be a threat of real or apparent corrup-
tion.”); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298 
(1981) (“Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The risk 
of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections simply is not pre-
sent in a popular vote on a public issue.”). 
 167. See Eisler, supra note 118, at 84–86; Ann Southworth, The Conse-
quences of Citizens United: What Do the Lawyers Say?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
525, 542–43 (2018). 
 168. See generally McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014); Ariz. Free En-
ter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011); Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 169. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 578–79 (2011). 
 170. See Eisler, supra note 118, at 87–91; Southworth, supra note 167, at 
531–42. 
 171. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN 
THE MODERN STATE 255, 277, 296 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992). 
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prevents meaningful “access” to the market;172 that economic in-
equality leads to outsized ideational influence;173 or that human 
irrationality leads to “market failures.”174  
Yet, despite this divide (between those who view the market 
as the problem and those who view market failures as the prob-
lem175), both types of interventionists appear to rely upon the 
conceptual assumptions critiqued in Part I in deciding whether 
to reject or double-down on the metaphor. In other words, while 
libertarians and interventionists alike deploy the language of 
markets in their debates, the first-order questions of market def-
inition addressed in Part I remain unresolved. This has implica-
tions for all sides.  
Interventionists fighting undue political influence face diffi-
cult questions about the proper baseline for measuring political 
equality (or, more critically framed, the “right” amount of gov-
ernment-sanctioned influence).176 How do we measure when a 
particular group or individual has become “too powerful” in the 
political process or the marketplace of ideas?177 “[W]hat does an 
undistorted and unskewed political process look like?”178 And 
who decides?179 As William Maurer points out, “politicians will 
likely continue to believe that politics is skewed whenever some-
one disagrees with them.”180  
Moreover, it hardly seems appropriate to speak of “market 
failures” when we lack any theory about what “competition” or 
“market power” are supposed to look like in a marketplace of 
ideas.181 Arguments about media consolidation and “market ac-
cess,” for example, hinge on definitional assumptions: that the 
relevant “market” is mass media, and that “access” is the ability 
 
 172. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press – A New First Amend-
ment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1655–56 (1967). 
 173. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 82, at 4–5. 
 174. See id. at 5, 35–36. 
 175. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Market Failures and Failures of Mar-
kets, 85 VA. L. REV. 1745 (1999). 
 176. See Derek Muller, The Case for More Money in Politics, LAW & LIBERTY 
(June 2, 2016), https://www.lawliberty.org/liberty-forum/the-case-for-more 
-money-in-politics/ [https://perma.cc/TLG2-EUZA]. 
 177. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 344 (2010). 
 178. William R. Maurer, Book Review, FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV., June 2016, 
at 60, 63. 
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to convey broadcast messages.182 (In this telling, the soapbox cit-
izen is not a participant in the marketplace at all.) But the press, 
for all its First Amendment importance,183 still consists of eco-
nomic entities making economic decisions in an economic mar-
ket, and so a purported “right of access” turns out to be a positive 
economic right as well: the right to an advertising contract.184  
Libertarians protesting government intervention have their 
own circles to square. One cannot argue that a law interferes 
with the proper function of the marketplace of ideas without 
knowing how such an “ideational market” functions. Protecting 
freedom of contract does not always protect free competition. In 
economic markets, a fully laissez-faire approach would allow for 
per se anticompetitive contracts such as price-fixing agreements. 
The Sherman Act prohibits such agreements185 because doing so 
enhances economic competition. Yet, we only know that the Sher-
man Act enhances competition (rather than “interfering” with it) 
because we have a theory of how economic competition operates.  
Antitrust laws do not engage in economic “equalizing” or fa-
vor particular competitors or products over others; rather, they 
protect the competitive process itself so consumers decide who 
wins and loses.186 Without any theory of ideational competition, 
the modern market metaphor glosses over such distinctions and 
ignores the category of “anticompetitive” conduct altogether. A 
marketplace of ideas with any coherent meaning would inher-
ently recognize that there must exist a range of permissible gov-
ernment interventions tailored to preventing anticompetitive 
conduct and promoting ideational competition.187 
 
 182. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248, 251 
(1974). 
 183. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 184. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
121 (1973) (considering “whether the ‘public interest’ standard of the Commu-
nications Act requires broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements or, 
whether, assuming governmental action, broadcasters are required to do so by 
reason of the First Amendment”); Barron, supra note 172, at 1667 (proposing a 
“common law duty to publish advertisements”).  
 185. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”); United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
 186. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 
(1977). 
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By conflating “freedom of contract” with “free competition” 
in its market metaphor,188 the Court’s laissez-faire approach has 
opened the door to conduct that one might expect to undermine 
the free operation of the market. Incorporating and evaluating 
the role that attentional choice plays in guiding exposure to 
ideas complicates this picture and introduces new nuances and 
conceptual distinctions into a debate that too often lacks both. 
B. CAMPAIGN FINANCE UNDER THE ATTENTIONAL-CHOICE 
MODEL 
An attentional-choice-focused approach to the marketplace 
of ideas creates new possibilities for more tailored legislative in-
terventions and more careful and considered judicial responses. 
In particular, recognizing attentional choice as the value-confer-
ring moment in market competition pries open analytical space 
across a number of dimensions. 
First, attention can help distinguish and refine the limits of 
the Court’s core principles of “more speech” and “free trade.” The 
“more speech” principle recognizes that “more speech, not less, 
is the governing rule” of the First Amendment.189 The “free 
trade” principle recognizes that “the ultimate good desired is bet-
ter reached by free trade in ideas” and “that the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market.”190  
As Part I demonstrates, however, the boundaries and mean-
ings of these principles to date have been vague and conflicting. 
The “more speech” principle has been used to refer to (and to 
justify) exposure to speech—an understanding at odds with ide-
ational competition and a robust “free trade” principle.191 And, 
when the Court has placed limits on its “more speech” rationale, 
it has done so in ways that recognize the practical impact of lim-
ited and mediated exposure to ideas, but not the constitutional 
consequences of these dynamics.192 
Second, considering the role of attention creates space to 
consider anew a whole range of different activities and agree-
ments that the Court has treated as constitutionally equivalent 
 
 188. See infra Part III.B.3.i. 
 189. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010). 
 190. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). 
 191. See supra Part I.A. 
 192. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 
721, 747 (2011). 
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under the First Amendment. “Speech,”193 “dissemination,”194 
“communication”195—all of these terms have been used in loose 
and interchangeable ways to describe activities that differ in 
how they relate to attentional choice.196 Examining the role of 
(and consequences for) attention in each instance provides a way 
to interrogate and clarify the language we use to describe con-
ceptually distinct activities in the marketplace of ideas. 
Finally, examining activities and agreements through their 
relationship with attentional choice provides a new way to chal-
lenge the Court’s (and the campaign-finance community’s) uni-
form treatment of money as “speech.” Both libertarians and in-
terventionists tend to view money as a monolith. For 
libertarians, money plays an inherent and inseparable part in 
all communicative exercises and any limit upon its use distorts 
the marketplace of ideas. For interventionists, economic and ide-
ational power constitute separate spheres and the unlimited use 
of money distorts the marketplace of ideas. An attentional-choice 
theory challenges the assumption that money “is” or “is not” 
speech and instead examines the competitive effects of particu-
lar uses of money. 
By looking at how expenditures influence the terms of access 
to our attention, an attentional-choice theory of competition 
could spur a more subtle and productive debate about what types 
of expenditures deserve strong constitutional protection and 
what types of expenditures do not. Some practices, agreements, 
and expenditures might be pro-competitive insofar as they en-
hance attentional choice and align it with exposure, and others 
may be anti-competitive insofar as they disregard or undermine 
the link between attentional choice and exposure. 
 
 193. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (referring 
to expression, distribution, and attention-purchase). 
 194. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819 (1975) (referring to dis-
tribution and attention-purchase). 
 195. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756–58 (1976) (referring to expression, distribution, and at-
tention-purchase). 
 196. See infra Parts III.B.1 (describing expression), III.B.2 (describing dis-
tribution aligned with attentional choice), III.B.3 (describing attentional pur-
chases and propagation unrelated to attentional choice). 
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1. Market Entry (Refining the “More Speech” Principle) 
The First Amendment prohibits the government from mak-
ing laws that “abridg[e] the freedom of speech.”197 When it was 
adopted, the First Amendment protected—at its core—the inal-
ienable natural right to the well-intentioned expression of one’s 
honest opinions.198 Because opinions “were understood to be non-
volitional,” the Amendment effectively protected the freedoms of 
conscience and thought.199 The Amendment also protected ordi-
nary natural rights—such as writing and publishing—but these 
were widely considered regulable to promote the public good and 
general welfare.200 
Today, of course, the First Amendment accords much 
broader protection to the creation and production of content—
even unpopular content disapproved by the public at large. This 
serves both individualist and democratic values. 
On individualist grounds, the Free Speech Clause “guaran-
tees each individual his day in a public arena” and “allow[s] 
[him] to ventilate his feelings and beliefs.”201 The freedom to cre-
ate and to express oneself is important in this view because the 
act of creation and expression itself is intrinsically important. 
Persons cannot be free, autonomous actors and full members of 
society unless they can express themselves, even if “[no] one else 
cares, or even listens.”202 This protects the dignitary interests of 
natural persons (such as the author of this Article) who feel com-
pelled to speak even when they know an idea is unlikely to gain 
broad exposure.  
On democratic grounds, the Free Speech Clause ensures 
that “no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no 
relevant information” is silenced by the government and thereby 
kept from the people and their consideration.203 This protects the 
speech of natural persons and legal entities alike for the purpose 
 
 197. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 198. Campbell, supra note 104, at 281–82. 
 199. See id. at 280–82. 
 200. See id. at 268–81. 
 201. Ingber, supra note 82, at 80. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Re-
form of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1993) (citing MEI-
KLEJOHN, supra note 13, at 75). 
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of natural persons deliberating as members of a democratic com-
munity.204 Because judgments about the value of these ideas—
including their importance, relevance, and even rationality—
must be reserved to the people, the First Amendment protects 
the expression of the vast majority of ideas.205  
From a marketplace perspective, this creation of content is 
a vital predicate to robust competition. There can be no competi-
tion in the absence of competitors. By protecting free entry into 
the marketplace of ideas, the Free Speech Clause ensures that a 
wide variety of ideas are available for consumption.206 This entry 
occurs when (or as) content comes into existence, whether a 
speech, a video, a manuscript, or a post online. 
To the extent the Supreme Court’s “more speech” principle 
stands for this proposition, it serves a critical and useful function 
in the marketplace of ideas.207 However, the “more speech” prin-
ciple cannot—and should not—be interpreted to mean that any 
particular piece of content is entitled to anyone’s attention. In-
creased exposure to attention through intermediaries must itself 
be the byproduct of success in the competitive process.208 Every 
speaker—like every business—thinks their product is the best 
 
 204. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (pro-
tecting corporate speech based on the “inherent worth of the speech in terms of 
its capacity for informing the public”). This interpretation might stand irrespec-
tive of whether corporations possess constitutional rights. The premise that cor-
porations do possess such rights, however, is worth revisiting. Such “unex-
amined assumptions have a way of becoming, by force of usage, unsound law.” 
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 280 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
The concept of constitutional corporate personhood is based on surprisingly lit-
tle “history, logic, or reason,” Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 
577 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting), and was “decided at an early date, with 
neither argument nor discussion,” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). 
 205. See FISS, supra note 144, at 43.  
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 51–53. 
 207. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 
457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (“Our precedents have focused ‘not only on the role of 
the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role 
in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of 
information and ideas.’ And we have recognized that ‘the State may not, con-
sistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of avail-
able knowledge.’” (emphasis added) (first quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783; then 
quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965))). 
 208. Of course, respect for attentional choice cannot silence expression itself 
(thereby foreclosing market entry). See infra note 294. Speakers are not, how-
ever, entitled to exposure via intermediaries. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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on the market and is worthy of the greatest market share. But 
that is not for the producer to decide. 
To protect free entry, the “more speech” principle extends 
First Amendment protections beyond the ideational marketplace 
itself to those economic expenditures necessary to formulate and 
produce content as well. Thus, while money is not speech, the 
Court recognizes that even “[t]he humblest handbill or leaflet 
entails printing [and] paper . . . costs.”209 If a person or associa-
tion is expending money on the generation of content (by produc-
ing a video, writing a book, printing yard signs, preparing a 
white paper, etc.), the expenses incident to those activities 
should receive strong constitutional protection under the Free 
Speech Clause. 
Such expenditures are integral to crafting the most compel-
ling messages. Capping these expenditures at any threshold 
could risk degrading the content (through diminished research, 
preparation, or production) or eliminating the content altogether 
(once the threshold is reached).210 Significant sums can be spent 
to produce An Inconvenient Truth just as they can be spent to 
produce Hillary: The Movie.211 A newspaper can spend whatever 
it wants on researching and printing an article about why the 
Glass-Steagall Act should be restored, just as Bank of America 
can spend whatever it wants on white papers or news alerts 
about why it should not be restored. A nonprofit can produce a 
video about economic justice, just as a concerned citizen can buy 
poster board and markers to protest.  
In each situation, the constitutional protection for the eco-
nomic expenditure derives from the ideationally protected activ-
ity. This ensures that the “more speech” principle remains 
closely tied to the individualistic, democratic, and market-entry 
functions of the Free Speech Clause. Thus, the “more speech” 
principle protects the creation and expression of content. How 
 
 209. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).  
 210. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 
230 (2006) (No. 04-1528) (“Once these low expenditure limits are exhausted, a 
candidate may not drive to the village green to address a rally, may not return 
the phone call from a reporter at the local newspaper, and may not call a neigh-
bor to urge her to get out to vote.”).  
  Even if one (reasonably) does not think the First Amendment must pro-
tect unlimited expenditures to fund the production of content, see, e.g., Jamal 
Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 38–43 (2018), con-
stitutional protection should arguably be at its highest for funds spent on cre-
ating content. 
 211. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319–20 (2010). 
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that content spreads throughout society and earns exposure, 
however, is governed by our next principle. 
2. Market Competition (Refining the “Free Trade” Principle) 
The centerpiece of the market metaphor is the “free trade” 
principle. As Justice Holmes wrote, “[T]he ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market . . . .”212 Because market competition is meant 
to reveal the assent of the people (rather than superiority by any 
supposed objective standard), the “truth” found through free ide-
ational exchange among market participants is measured by 
success in earning the attention of the listener.213 The ideational 
market—like the economic market—does not produce a single 
universal good or herd all consumers towards one product; it re-
spects and responds to the varied preferences of its participants.  
The “free trade” principle protects competition within the 
marketplace of ideas. While all ideas—popular and unpopular—
are welcome to enter the public sphere under the “more speech” 
principle, not all ideas can (or should) win attention under the 
“free trade” principle. The First Amendment was enacted “when 
the main threat to the nation’s political speech environment was 
state suppressions of dissidents” and its interpretation to date 
has “focuse[d] exclusively on the protection of speakers from gov-
ernment.”214 Today, however, “it is no longer speech itself that is 
scarce, but the attention of listeners.”215 The nonnegotiable con-
straint of time means we only have so much attention to spare, 
and reality prevents us from consuming more than a fraction of 
the content accessible to us.  
Given these constraints, we must make choices about what 
to consume and which sources are worthy of our informational 
dependence. In a free marketplace of ideas, the choice of the con-
sumer is constitutionally protected, not the choice of the planner 
or the producer.216 The listener—not the speaker—decides what 
 
 212. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).  
 213. See supra Part I.C. 
 214. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, in THE FREE SPEECH CEN-
TURY, supra note 143, at 272, 273. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See Blasi, supra note 61, at 41. 
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content is worthy of attention in a competitive ideational mar-
ket.217 Some may choose Fox News and some may choose 
MSNBC, but one cannot spend the same minute on both.  
In this way, a market participant’s expressive and receptive 
decisions play equally important roles in fulfilling the First 
Amendment’s autonomy-respecting and democracy-enhancing 
purposes. “Our political system and cultural life rest upon” the 
principle that “each person should decide for himself or herself 
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and 
adherence.”218  
To protect free competition within the marketplace of ideas, 
the “free trade” principle extends First Amendment protection to 
those expenditures necessary to distribute (or make available) 
content to satisfy attentional market demand. “[B]ecause virtu-
ally every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society 
requires the expenditure of money,” any limitation upon distri-
bution expenditures might risk “restricting the number of issues 
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the au-
dience reached.”219 As the Court has recognized, “Liberty of cir-
culating is as essential . . . as liberty of publishing; indeed, with-
out the circulation, the publication would be of little value.”220  
Yet, as above, the constitutional protection for the economic 
expenditure derives from the ideationally protected activity. 
Economic expenditures for the distribution and availability of 
content are only protected under the First Amendment to the 
extent they help satisfy attentional demand. Funds spent to 
meet the aggregate demands of consumers in the ideational mar-
ket are vital to ensuring that popular speakers and content gain 
the exposure they deserve and that ideas can travel as far as 
their reputation or merits will take them. When economic funds 
follow attentional demand, the integrity of the marketplace of 
ideas is preserved and the most compelling content and most 
 
 217. See NEUBORNE, supra note 59, at 98. 
 218. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (emphasis 
added); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (noting that 
the public has “the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and 
speakers are worthy of consideration” (emphasis added)). 
 219. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). 
 220. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (quoting Ex parte Jack-
son, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)). This is in tension with the strongest readings of 
the First Amendment’s autonomy value. See supra note 202 and accompanying 
text. 
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trusted speakers earn their wide exposure and large attentional 
market share. 
It is no coincidence that “[s]ome of our most valued forms of 
fully protected speech are uttered for a profit.”221 “[T]he pam-
phlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge.”222 
Paine “wasn’t paying for people to read his words—readers were 
paying to buy [his] book.”223 Similarly, “media corporations make 
money by making political commentary, including endorse-
ments.”224 Purveyors of such information can charge for its dis-
tribution because the audience has assigned their content atten-
tional value. This is the marketplace of ideas at its finest—
content traveling far and wide based on consumers’ decentral-
ized choices. 
Consumers may choose established purveyors of infor-
mation (such as The Wall Street Journal or The New York Times) 
or consumers may choose newer entrants. In today’s rich media 
environment, one can choose Andrew Sullivan225 or Josh Mar-
shall,226 The Volokh Conspiracy227 or Take Care.228 What matters 
is that people choose this content—they have decided that such 
speakers and intermediaries provide information that is worth 
their time. 
 
 221. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) 
(citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)); see also Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 390 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 222. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943). 
 223. DEREK D. CRESSMAN, WHEN MONEY TALKS: THE HIGH PRICE OF “FREE” 
SPEECH AND THE SELLING OF DEMOCRACY 38 (2016).  
 224. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 225. Andrew Sullivan, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_ 
Sullivan [https://perma.cc/3XH7-C9CV] (“Sullivan is a conservative political 
commentator . . . [and] [h]e started a political blog in 2000 . . . .”). 
 226. Josh Marshall, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josh_ 
Marshall [https://perma.cc/3B27-UQWM] (“Marshall . . . is an American jour-
nalist and blogger . . . [who] presides over a network of progressive-oriented 
sites that . . . average 400,000-page views every weekday and 750,000 unique 
visitors every month.”). 
 227. The Volokh Conspiracy, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_ 
Volokh_Conspiracy [https://perma.cc/VL8K-EM57] (“The Volokh Conspiracy is 
a blog . . . covering legal and political issues from an ideological orienta-
tion . . . [of] ‘generally libertarian, conservative, centrist, or some mixture of 
these.’”). 
 228. About Us, TAKE CARE, https://takecareblog.com/about-us [https://perma 
.cc/LC3T-FGF3] (“Take Care [is a blog that] addresses a wide range of legal 
questions arising under President Trump.”). 
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Protecting distribution expenditures deemed meaningful by 
the market not only accords with Supreme Court precedent,229 it 
imbues the Free Press Clause with freestanding, independent 
constitutional significance230 while adopting a neutral posture 
when it comes to actually defining “the press.” Although the 
First Amendment spells out separate protection for the press by 
its plain terms,231 the Court has lamented “the difficulty, and 
perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing, either as a matter of 
fact or constitutional law, media corporations from [nonmedia] 
corporations.”232 The Court usually treats the Free Press Clause 
“as just another colony of the imperial Free Speech Clause, 
which does all the legal work.”233 Determining who/what quali-
fies as “the media” for constitutional purposes has become espe-
cially delicate in an age when anyone can publish a blog, post a 
comment on Facebook, or upload a video to YouTube.234  
If one recognizes that attentional capacity is limited and be-
lieves the Free Press Clause was “designed to ensure a free 
speaker the ability to reach a mass audience”235 but not the right 
to reach a mass audience,236 then “the press” can become as fluid 
and flexible as the ideational market desires while remaining 
objectively identifiable as a matter of constitutional law. The 
rapid expansion of new media, for example, has generally 
tracked public interest.237 When an organization cultivates a fol-
lowing based on voluntary attentional choices,238 the Constitu-
tion should protect the expenses that make its content available.  
 
 229. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349–51 (2010). 
 230. See Campbell, supra note 104, at 249 (“Conventional wisdom holds that 
the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press were equivalent concepts, 
together comprising what we would now call a freedom of expression.”); see id. 
at 268 (historically, “speech and press freedoms were legally distinct, with the 
latter referring only to the customary legal rules that protected printing-press 
operators”). 
 231. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 232. First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796 (1978) (Burger, 
C.J., concurring).  
 233. NEUBORNE, supra note 59, at 103. 
 234. Nathaniel Persily, The Campaign Revolution Will Not Be Televised, AM. 
INT. (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/10/10/the 
-campaign-revolution-will-not-be-televised/ [https://perma.cc/K6XQ-L6SM]. 
 235. NEUBORNE, supra note 59, at 19 (emphasis added). 
 236. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 237. DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE IDEAS INDUSTRY 27 (2017). 
 238. As technology progresses, there may be limits to what attentional 
choices can truly be called “voluntary.” See infra notes 280–92 and accompany-
ing text. 
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In his McConnell dissent, Justice Scalia articulates how 
such economic transactions are necessary to create content and 
satisfy consumers’ attentional choices: 
In any economy operated on even the most rudimentary principles of 
division of labor, effective public communication requires the speaker 
to make use of the services of others. An author may write a novel, but 
he will seldom publish and distribute it himself. A freelance reporter 
may write a story, but he will rarely edit, print, and deliver it to sub-
scribers. To a government bent on suppressing speech, this mode of 
organization presents opportunities: Control any cog in the machine, 
and you can halt the whole apparatus. . . . Instead of regulating the 
various parties to the enterprise individually, the government can sup-
press their ability to coordinate by regulating their use of money. What 
good is the right to print books without a right to buy works from au-
thors? Or the right to publish newspapers without the right to pay de-
liverymen? The right to speak would be largely ineffective if it did not 
include the right to engage in financial transactions that are the inci-
dents of its exercise.239 
Where economic expenditures are necessary to make content 
available in response to attentional decisions by consumers (i.e., 
success in the ideational market, rather than the economic mar-
ket), the First Amendment extends protection. By construing the 
Free Press Clause in this manner, the Court can protect the 
press and let the market define it. 
These protections need not only apply to those who produce 
content for a profit.240 If a nonprofit organization wishes to spend 
money to make content available for free, then such expendi-
tures should also receive strong constitutional protection. Mak-
ing content freely accessible to those who choose to consume it 
reduces the economic barriers to dissemination and aids in the 
free flow of information that is spreading based on attentional 
demand. Whether one is paying website hosting fees,241 booking 
a venue for a political rally,242 or making content freely available 
on-demand to cable subscribers,243 the “free trade” principle 
should fully protect the expenditure. 
Our choices about which intermediaries continue to deserve 
our trust over time play a vital role not only in how information 
 
 239. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 251 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 240. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952). 
 241. See, e.g., Bailey v. Me. Comm’n on Gov. Ethics & Elec. Practices, 900 F. 
Supp. 2d 75, 79 (D. Me. 2012).  
 242. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). 
 243. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010); Persily, su-
pra note 234 (“Hillary: The Movie was an ideologically motivated hatchet job on 
a presidential candidate, to be sure, but it was one that viewers needed to seek 
out if they wished to watch it. It was not imposed on them.”).  
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travels throughout society, but in what kind of information gains 
widespread exposure. This might cause some readers concern: 
What if our attentional choices promote virality over veracity, 
popularity over quality?244 What if “We the People” reward the 
worst ideas? The short answer is as unavoidable as it is unsur-
prising: the Constitution cannot guarantee our success or save 
us from ourselves. Despite the Supreme Court’s sunny assur-
ances, free choices and free speech can give rise to a variety of 
economic and ideational preferences both good (kale and tax pol-
icy) and bad (cigarettes and spiteful rhetoric). Framed as a mar-
ket or not, ignoring that reality serves no one.  
One need not (and should not expect to) rely solely on mar-
kets’ self-correcting properties to address lies and falsehoods. 
There is no basis to believe that “free competition between ideas” 
will inevitably privilege true information or eliminate false in-
formation, and there is good reason to suspect the opposite.245 
Unfair, deceptive, and misleading trade practices are regulated 
in the economic market specifically because consumers find them 
so seductive, and various scholars have entered the fray over just 
how falsity might be addressed in meaningful ways.246 That is 
an important discussion, but it is not one I take up in this Article. 
Suffice it to say, a more realistic market metaphor should also 
carry more realistic expectations: a market that is driven by con-
sumer choices will cater to a wide variety of consumer prefer-
ences.247  
Nonetheless, an attentional marketplace is not entirely 
without meaningful effect on this score. That is because our re-
lational decisions about who to trust with access to our attention 
provide a critical counterbalance to our quicker, baser instincts. 
 
 244. See Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DE-
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Over the short run, outrage and lies are undoubtedly potent driv-
ers of human attention. Novelty and negativity “grab our atten-
tion as human beings,” and “[i]t’s all too easy to create both when 
you’re not bound by the limitations of reality.”248 This remains 
as true today as it has been throughout much of history.249 
The first contested presidential election in 1796 was strewn 
with lies.250 During Jefferson’s second run, his opponents 
claimed his election would lead to “a national orgy of rape, incest, 
and adultery.”251 And, only two years after appearing on the 
scene in 1833, the New York Sun (the first “penny paper” to de-
rive its revenues primarily from advertising) began running a 
series about amazing “astronomical discoveries” on the moon, in-
cluding “great seas and canyons, pillars of red rock and lunar 
trees” and, yes, alien life: “winged creatures” that “averaged four 
feet in height” and were covered in “short and glossy  
copper-coloured hair.”252 This is not exactly confidence-inspiring. 
Modern dynamics can be equally sobering. Social media 
platforms, which are designed to maximize user attention, use 
data “to predict what will cause you to react most strongly, and 
then giv[e] you more of that.”253 An empirical study of falsehoods 
on Twitter found that “falsehood diffused significantly farther, 
faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories 
of information.”254 While “the truth rarely diffused to more than 
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not look back so longingly. See Barron, supra note 172, at 1647. 
 250. Catherine J. Ross, Ministry of Truth: Why Law Can’t Stop Prevarica-
tions, Bullshit, and Straight-Out Lies in Political Campaigns, 16 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 367, 368 (2017). 
 251. Id. (quoting BRUCE L. FELKNOR, DIRTY POLITICS 21 (1966)). 
 252. WU, supra note 41, at 12–17. 
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MONTHLY (Jan. 7, 2018), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january 
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1000 people, the top 1% of false-news cascades routinely diffused 
to between 1000 and 100,000 people.”255 False political news in 
particular “traveled deeper and more broadly, reached more peo-
ple, and was more viral than any other category of false infor-
mation.”256 
Over the long run, however, the story becomes more com-
plex. Like any relationship, there are limits to what we will tol-
erate from our informational intermediaries. The friend who 
constantly exaggerates earns skepticism, while the friend who 
tells it straight earns trust. Corrective mechanisms make real 
social circles and chosen sources of information answerable for 
abuses of our attention. The “disenchantment effect,” for exam-
ple, protects us from “a continual diet of the purely sensa-
tional.”257  
Whereas the penny papers of the 1830s eventually ran into 
the ground, “The New York Times and The Wall Street Jour-
nal . . . beat out their rivals in the late nineteenth century not by 
being more sensational, but less.”258 Editors, writers, newscast-
ers, and other intermediaries are repeat players who must con-
stantly balance the short-term need to maintain the audience’s 
attention with the long-term need to maintain the audience’s 
trust.259 The audience, in turn, rewards intermediaries that 
strike this balance with repeat business. Such relationships lead 
to the wider circulation of information that does more than grab 
our attention—it aims to be worthy of our attention.260 
Facebook’s continual tweaking of its algorithms also re-
flects—in part—the balance that intermediaries must strike to 
retain voluntary and sustained attention. Several years ago, Fa-
cebook was awash in “clickbait stories” that people hated “even 
 
 255. Id. at 1148. 
 256. Id.; see also Persily, supra note 244, at 68. 
 257. WU, supra note 41, at 23, 100–01. 
 258. Id. at 100–01. 
 259. See Blocher, supra note 99, at 857 (“Just like market actors, repeat 
speech players are less likely to violate norms, lie, or break promises, because 
they know that repeat interactions are inevitable.”). 
 260. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248, 258 (1974) 
(providing great constitutional deference to a newspaper’s “exercise of editorial 
control and judgment”); see also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“The power of a privately 
owned newspaper to advance its own political, social, and economic views is 
bounded by . . . the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers . . . [and] the 
journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers.”). 
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though they often clicked on them.”261 Those posting had figured 
out what kind of headlines captured users’ attention and gamed 
Facebook’s algorithm. Our “behavioral self” gorged on these sto-
ries, even while our “aspirational self” did not want to.262 To 
avoid losing users over the long-term, Facebook downgraded the 
most clickbait-y headlines despite their efficacy in grabbing at-
tention.263  
So too has Facebook reacted to the fallout from the 2016 
election—and the loss of users that followed264—by refining its 
algorithms. To retain its audience,265 Facebook began curbing 
the spread of hoaxes and misinformation,266 disrupting “coordi-
nated inauthentic behavior” on its platform,267 and promoting 
the circulation of articles that users actually took the time to 
read before sharing.268 Even the depressing Twitter study above 
found that true tweets inspired trust in the speaker.269  
These relational dynamics matter: when people “develop 
trust in institutions, . . . that trust can give the institution more 
power.”270 This creates a virtuous feedback loop. Not only are 
sources less inclined to abuse the attention of their audience, but 
 
 261. THOMPSON, supra note 65, at 271. 
 262. Id. at 270. 
 263. See id. at 270–71. 
 264. See Alina Selyukh, Postelection, Overwhelmed Facebook Users Un-
friend, Cut Back, NPR (Nov. 20, 2016, 6:34 PM), https://npr.org/sections/ 
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Problems, WIRED (July 25, 2018, 11:18 PM), https://wired.com/story/facebook 
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-madison-mob-rule/568351/ [https://perma.cc/9P3T-J3DR]. 
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listeners “find news more credible if trusted people vouch for its 
veracity and relevance.”271  
Studies have also found that “the best way to combat politi-
cal misperceptions is through the use of ‘surprising validators,’ 
meaning individuals and institutions that are credible to persons 
operating under the misperception(s) in question.”272 In other 
words, a theory of ideational competition that incorporates and 
respects the role of social groups, intermediaries, and relational 
information might enhance our ability to process new infor-
mation that conflicts with our existing preconceptions.  
Requiring speakers and content to run this gauntlet of de-
centralized vetting in order to earn broad exposure begins to 
sound more like a market. Nonetheless, some may worry that 
intermediaries carry an inherent threat of bias. Professor John 
McGinnis, for example, has argued that liberal-leaning report-
ers, academics, and celebrities have “powerful platforms” that 
“make it easy for them to directly propagate ideas.”273  
Yet, the power of intermediaries is both inevitable and in-
herently nonpartisan. Unless one lives alone in a cabin in the 
woods, informational mediation is a fact of life. This dynamic has 
no inherent political slant. Ideational “market signals” like trust 
and reputation are defined by market participants’ own social 
circles and cues. Fox News is a trusted brand among its consum-
ers274 and consistently ranks as the market leader in news outlet 
viewership.275 So, too, do social groups treat particular claims to 
authority differently. “Arguing from authority only works if the 
authority is recognized and legitimized by others,” and “there 
has been a slow-motion erosion of trust in prestigious institu-
tions and professions for the past half century.”276 Market sig-
 
 271. El-Haj, supra note 77, at 1263 n.183 (quoting THEDA SKOCPOL & 
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nals are constantly being constructed, deconstructed, and recon-
structed within and among social groups,277 and which social 
groups rise in salience at any given moment is itself based on 
what identities are activated by speakers and participants in the 
market.278 
Because mere exposure to information inherently involves 
selection and prioritization among competing speakers and 
speech, we can begin to appreciate how our decisions about who 
to trust with our attention impacts the marketplace of ideas. Be-
cause information necessarily travels through gatekeepers, 
those with access to our attention have an immense amount of 
power to determine which ideas gain wide exposure and how 
those ideas are framed.279 Privileging those who have earned our 
attention and trust ensures that our intermediaries remain ac-
countable and that the marketplace of ideas remains free and 
competitive.  
Now, to be sure, a doctrinal turn towards attentional choice 
raises a host of complexities that emphasize both the concept’s 
malleability and its importance, especially in our information-
rich, data-driven world. The upper parts of our brain provide a 
voluntary mechanism for directing attention, but the lower parts 
of our brain also provide an involuntary mechanism for directing 
attention.280 It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the 
myriad ways in which the methods for sustained attention-cap-
ture in the modern, algorithm-driven social-media era might dif-
fer in type or degree from the methods for earning attention in 
the past with respect to one’s volition. Whether and how various 
modern practices might undermine or enhance attentional voli-
tion present important interdisciplinary questions worth addi-
tional study if attentional choice takes a more central role in 
First Amendment doctrine. Nonetheless, some aspects of the 
 
 277. Trust in the “Fourth Estate” has fallen to thirty-two percent in recent 
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modern attention economy would seem to deserve more immedi-
ate inquiry. 
First, many social media platforms now employ technical 
and nonexpressive components that prey on known psychologi-
cal tendencies to create patterns of addiction.281 Twitter’s “pull 
to refresh” function and “loading” wheel, for example, do not re-
flect content but are conscience design choices known to build 
sensations of anticipation and reward in the user experience in 
order to develop non-conscious habits.282 These habit-forming 
devices undoubtedly garner our attention but stray far from the 
goal of encouraging voluntary sustained attention based on one’s 
conscious appraisal of an intermediary’s content quality, edito-
rial selection, or other personal balance of interest and rele-
vance.  
Second, large online platforms increasingly exercise control 
over attention in ways that go well beyond the editorial power of 
traditional intermediaries.283 As modern clearinghouses for ac-
cess to more traditional sources of news content as well as up-
dates from friends and family, social media companies increas-
ingly act as “mega-intermediaries” that users may consider “too 
big to leave.” If participants in the ideational marketplace are to 
retain genuine attentional choice, this may—unironically—re-
quire more rigorous economic antitrust enforcement and poli-
cies. Attentional choice is only effective insofar as there are gen-
uinely diverse and competing options vying for attention.  
For example, in 2012, Instagram and Facebook “were com-
peting for much the same attention—the same hours—that con-
sumers might devote to [social media].”284 Professor Tim Wu 
points out that, by strictly focusing on cash-market analyses and 
allowing Facebook to acquire Instagram, antitrust agencies 
overlooked vital attentional competition between the two enti-
ties.285 From the perspective of economic competition, this meant 
that Facebook could remove Instagram as an emerging competi-
tor in the attentional market before it had converted its atten-
tional share into advertising revenue.286 From the perspective of 
 
 281. See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming Technology, 88 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 129, 133–34 (2019). 
 282. See id. 
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ideational competition, however, the acquisition also removed a 
source of content discipline from the market. With both Facebook 
and Instagram under unified control, each has less incentive to 
strike an appropriate, responsible, and sustainable balance be-
tween powerful short-term appeal, sustainable long-term ap-
peal, and broad content appeal. Users tired or skeptical of the 
content on one platform are captured by the other.  
Finally, while both traditional media sources and social me-
dia platforms engage in an exposure-selection process that in-
volves a kind of “editorial control,” one might wonder if these 
processes can be equated without overlooking something funda-
mentally different about their attention-capture models. Tradi-
tional editorial decisions use human judgment and seek to earn 
the attention of a community by crafting an offering tempered 
by the values and mores of that human editorial judgment. Al-
gorithms, on the other hand, “engage in autonomous decision-
making about what should happen next, basing predictions 
[about each individual user] on what [that user has done] be-
fore.”287 These algorithms surgically refine their selections based 
on an individual user’s ever-growing body of past behaviors and 
draw additional guidance from vast data sets and analytics tools 
and technologies that monitor that user’s online activities out-
side of the platform.288  
In the past, individualized tailoring of content was only pos-
sible through deep, sustained human relationships—with infor-
mation conveyed in the context of trusted associations and com-
munities. Informational intermediaries exercising editorial 
judgment to capture attention, meanwhile, could only forge trust 
at the level of the community. Platforms that serve individually 
tailored content selected by algorithm might begin to undercut 
the human engagement that previously formed the core of the 
marketplace’s presumed consensus-building function. Moreover, 
while emotion and sensationalism have long been used to garner 
attention and to carry readers along (and therefore play an ap-
propriate role in persuasion), social-media algorithms today 
“keep users always ‘on the rails,’” using data to feed content that 
aims to keep users in a kind of sustained attentional stupor that 
might, at some point, begin to test the boundaries of what can be 
called genuine attentional “choice.”289 
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These final dynamics admittedly cut close to the quick. The 
claim that modern platforms might be too effective at holding 
our attention raises difficult questions about the boundaries of 
human volition and the core purposes and practices of the mar-
ket.290 These questions deserve further consideration and study. 
Both habit-forming design and ideational market consolidation, 
however, reflect areas where immediate legislative intervention 
would seem appropriate under almost any attentional-choice 
framework.291 A doctrine that accords constitutional significance 
to genuine attentional choices would also leave additional space 
for legislators to protect and enhance free exercise of speech as 
they gain a greater understanding of how attention is earned 
and allocated in fact.292 The importance of protecting attentional 
volition becomes especially clear when one considers the “free 
trade” principle’s autonomy- and democracy-enhancing values. 
From an individualist perspective, privileging our free at-
tentional choices and respecting our assessments about speak-
ers’ and intermediaries’ trustworthiness deepens our own per-
sonal development and provides us greater autonomy and 
agency in setting out our own direction. Given how contingent 
our informational exposure is, how reliant we are upon interme-
diaries, and how radically their selection shapes our growth, val-
ues, ideologies, and sense of identity and community, our choice 
in intermediaries is among the most significant we can make.  
More fundamentally, what we pay attention to (by choice or 
otherwise) is our conscious experience—it is our very sense of 
existence and being.293 For this reason, it would seem more than 
strange to think that “[h]earers [do not possess] dignitary rights 
to self-fulfillment and self-definition, too.”294  
 
 290. In the economic marketplace, for example, the Supreme Court has gen-
erally disfavored predatory pricing claims. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223–27 (1993). Saying that prices are 
too low raises difficult questions about the boundaries of proper market func-
tion. See id. 
 291. See infra Part IV. 
 292. See id. 
 293. Wu, supra note 50, at 780. 
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a speaker. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). I may not want to 
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Nor are our autonomy interests limited to “listening” 
choices: As informational intermediaries in our own right, our 
choices about what to share (and what not to share) within our 
social groups aren’t just part of how the marketplace functions—
they’re also self-defining. “People do not share content solely be-
cause it is informative. . . . They want to be heard and seen, and 
respected.”295 What we share is part of who we are, how we de-
fine ourselves as individuals, and how we situate ourselves 
within our broader communities.  
From a democratic perspective, the “free trade” principle 
does more than acknowledge that “the people” should be en-
trusted with the direction of public debate as a matter of the-
ory,296 it protects the decentralized process by which the people 
shape public debate as a matter of fact. Structuring protections 
for economic expenditures around their role in responding to at-
tentional choices recognizes that value in the marketplace of 
ideas can only be assigned by consumers—not the speakers 
themselves.  
The “free trade” principle also recognizes that value in the 
marketplace of ideas is measured by the depth and breadth of 
the interest and attention we accord as a society, not by any ab-
solute or objective quality intrinsic to information itself. It is “the 
power of [a] thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market” that determines whether we have found “ground 
upon which [our] wishes safely can be carried out.”297 In an at-
tentional-choice market, we all have a role in shaping the politi-
cal dialogue and determining our course as a nation. 
 
the cost of living in a free society as well as one of its profound benefits—the 
unexpected insight, the growth through discomfort, the serendipitous encoun-
ter.  
  Full control over access to one’s attention at all times is neither the goal 
nor the animating principle of the attentional-choice theory (for that is incon-
sistent with both reality and the First Amendment). When one makes a con-
scious choice in selecting particular content or a particular intermediary, how-
ever, that decision carries constitutional significance in the marketplace of 
ideas. Exposure via intermediaries that does not carry this imprimatur may be 
susceptible to greater legislative regulation in the public interest. See infra Part 
III.B.3.i. 
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3. Anticompetitive Conduct  
With a more robust theory of ideational competition, both 
private conduct and government action bearing on the market-
place of ideas appear in a new light. An attentional-choice ap-
proach does not relegate the judicial role to ad hoc balancing and 
uncritical deference, nor does it foreclose legislative power based 
on bald fictions.298  
Instead, the theory looks to the actual terms of access to our 
attention to ascertain how exposure is being allocated. Under 
this approach, judges would maintain a critical role in prevent-
ing government barriers to entry or other public interferences 
with trade consistent with several aspects of existing doctrine 
under Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United. However, this ap-
proach would also demand judicial deference when the political 
branches seek to promote ideational competition or intervene to 
disrupt private anticompetitive conduct. 
i. Private Interference 
Looking to the actual terms upon which access to our atten-
tion occurs provides a radical new way to examine private con-
duct bearing on the marketplace of ideas. If economic expendi-
tures driven by attentional demand are pro-competitive, then 
economic agreements that propagate exposure and consume at-
tention in the absence of any underlying consumer choice frus-
trate the operation of the marketplace of ideas. Such content has 
not “earned its keep” through competition. 
I do not intend for this Article to establish an exhaustive 
taxonomy of competitive and anticompetitive ideational conduct. 
However, there is at least one kind of expenditure worth explor-
ing more here given how differently it could be treated under an 
attentional-choice model: payments for advertising. Advertising 
agreements reflect the sale of human time and attention.299 
“[W]hat advertisers are paying for [is] access to the minds of con-
sumers.”300 A speaker that has earned and cultivated that access 
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to attention through free trade (such as a newspaper) sells that 
access to a speaker that has not earned the consumer’s attention 
(such as a shampoo manufacturer or a political candidate).301  
By definition, advertisements contain content that no one 
chose to consume from speakers that no one chose to trust with 
their attention. Ad expenditures circumvent ideational competi-
tion by skipping the value-conferring step where consumers 
choose to assign their attention. As a result, ideas come to dom-
inate the public debate based on largely content-neutral trans-
actions: a newspaper sells a quarter-page of paper; a network 
sells thirty seconds of airtime; a social media provider sells a 
“promoted” location within one’s Twitter or Facebook feed. 
Whatever message the purchaser may ultimately choose to fill 
that blank space, the advertising transaction itself involves the 
purchase of access to attention alone.302  
Consider, for example, the run-up to the 2018 midterm elec-
tions. In March 2018, the Democrats’ “House Majority PAC” re-
served $43 million worth of television ad time across thirty-three 
media markets.303 In April 2018, the Republicans’ “Congres-
sional Leadership Fund” responded by booking $48 million in 
ads, with $38 million going to television airtime and $10 million 
going to digital advertising.304 That’s $91 million spent on access 
to audience attention alone before any content has been pro-
duced. There was no “expression” to speak of yet and no one 
chose to entrust these organizations with their attention, but one 
could already be sure that their messages would reach millions 
of Americans. This makes a mockery of the marketplace of ideas. 
 
 301. See id. at 772 (describing the basic model of the “attention industry” as 
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To be sure, the purchaser of an ad block makes the expendi-
ture for the purpose of spreading a message far and wide—but 
the question here turns on the terms of access to the consumer’s 
attention, not the reasons the producer might want that atten-
tion. In a mediated and attention-constrained marketplace of 
ideas, increased exposure must be understood as the result of 
competition, not its predicate.305 Attention must be earned, not 
bought. The fact that spreading an idea far and wide might be 
extremely difficult is precisely the point.  
Unlike expenditures protected under the “more speech” 
principle (which are incidents of speech) or expenditures pro-
tected under the “free trade” principle (which reflect value as-
cribed by the listener), expenditures for advertising reflect noth-
ing more than value ascribed by the speaker. Judgments by 
speakers about the relative value of their own speech are enti-
tled to no special protection in the marketplace of ideas. The 
whole purpose of a market-based approach is to leave agenda-
setting and moderation of the public debate to the public itself. 
Everyone wants to command a large market share. In a compet-
itive market, producers can only acquire that position by earning 
it. Advertising transactions circumvent the market mechanism 
and move attentional sovereignty (and ideational power) from 
consumers to producers.  
Taken together, the freedom of speech (with the right to 
spend on creating content), and the freedom of the press (with 
the right to spend on meeting attentional demand) protect the 
ability of a speaker to earn a wide audience. Neither freedom, 
however, creates a right of a speaker to a wide audience. Such a 
“right” is incompatible with the terms of competition for atten-
tion and exposure. The perverse notion that one might be enti-
tled to the ear of another is the instinct of the authoritarian306 
and the first step towards transforming the First Amendment 
from a bulwark of political liberty into a tool for political domi-
nation.307 The size of one’s audience—the exposure one re-
ceives—is for the market to decide. 
Rather than deriving from the First Amendment itself, the 
constitutional protection that advertising receives comes from 
the Court’s own laissez-faire doctrine. That doctrine fails to dis-
tinguish between free competition and free contract.308 Without 
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a theory of ideational competition, the Court has allowed the 
market metaphor to morph into a constitutional right to enter 
into any contract relating to expressive content or activity. By 
elevating free contract over free trade (and creating a supposed 
“right to an audience”), the Court has inadvertently crafted con-
stitutional protections for anticompetitive agreements.  
If the Court applied a similar theory in the economic sphere, 
the result would be a constitutional right to price-fixing agree-
ments, output restrictions, collusion, and cartels. Such an inter-
pretation would defy common sense, distort the market, under-
mine competition, and justifiably provoke widespread popular 
outrage. That we see this result unfolding in the marketplace of 
ideas, then, should be no surprise.309  
To realign the market metaphor with the First Amendment, 
the Supreme Court should recognize that no one has a “right to 
others’ attention” in a market where attention is itself the re-
source over which competition occurs. To be sure, the concept of 
attentional choice cannot go so far as to foreclose market entry 
and silence the production of content that one finds objectionable 
or unpleasant.310 But a “right to attention” cannot coexist with a 
“right to compete for attention.”  
Once one removes a purported “right to attention,” any con-
stitutional right to unlimited expenditures in support of that 
right fall with it. As under the “more speech” and “free trade” 
principles, constitutional protections for expenditures derive 
from the constitutionally protected activity they support.311 
When the right to the activity disappears, so does the right to 
the attendant expenditures. 
Here, the Court must be careful to distinguish between how 
it treats the content found in advertisements and how it treats 
the vehicle of advertising. The vehicle of advertising can be used 
to convey all kinds of content: political content, commercial con-
tent (i.e., “speech . . . propos[ing] a commercial transaction”),312 
etc. In Supreme Court precedent to date, this distinction has 
gone largely overlooked, complicating campaign-finance and 
commercial-speech law313 alike.  
 
 309. See infra Conclusion. 
 310. See supra note 294. 
 311. See supra Parts III.B.1–2. 
 312. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 761–62 (1976). 
 313. See infra note 317. 
  
2020] FIGHTING FOR ATTENTION 2215 
 
One of the only cases to address this distinction directly—
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan—barely analyzed the issue.314 
In Sullivan, the Court addressed whether and how the First 
Amendment impacted state libel law regulating the contents of 
an advertisement in The New York Times, holding that a plain-
tiff must show “actual malice” to prevail.315 An attentional-
choice model would do nothing to alter the reasoning, holding, or 
outcome of that decision. 
Yet, in a mere two paragraphs (out of a fifty-page decision) 
the Court suggested in dicta that the distinction between an ar-
ticle in The New York Times and an advertisement in The New 
York Times was of no constitutional significance whatsoever, dis-
missively stating, “That the Times was paid for publishing the 
advertisement is as immaterial . . . as is the fact that newspa-
pers and books are sold.”316 That may be true with respect to the 
level of protection the contents of an advertisement should re-
ceive, but not the level of protection expenditures on the vehicle 
itself should receive.317  
 
 314. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).  
 315. See id. at 279–92. 
 316. Id. at 266. 
 317. Because the vehicle of advertising can convey content of any variety, to 
say that “advertising pure and simple” falls within the bounds of “commercial 
speech” muddles the inquiry. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 
U.S. 626, 637 (1985). Content should not lose its protections simply because 
“money is spent to project it,” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761, but 
such a broad characterization (“to project”) conflates various market practices 
and encompasses far more than advertising. 
   The early commercial-speech cases, for example, involved prohibitions 
on the expression and distribution of targeted content, not just its advertise-
ment. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 750 (statute punishing phar-
macist if he or she “publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in 
any manner whatsoever” drug prices); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 812–
13 (1975) (statute barring “any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, 
or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner” from 
providing information about abortion services). Such direct prohibitions on free 
speech and free competition raise far more profound First Amendment problems 
than the regulation of advertising purchases alone and using the term “project” 
to encompass every use of money for every activity prohibited by such a statute 
obscures more than it explains.  
  Nonetheless, it also remains true that the messages found in advertise-
ments “do not forfeit [their] protection because they were published in the form 
of a paid advertisement.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266; see also Bates v. State Bar 
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977). The content itself remains fully protected, and 
unlimited expenditures can be used to support the circulation and distribution 
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If the terms of exposure to ideas matter, then a reader’s pay-
ment for a newspaper’s content differs from an advertiser’s pay-
ment for a newspaper’s readers.318 The former primarily reflects 
ideational power; the latter primarily reflects economic power. 
When a speaker pays to commandeer the attention of an audi-
ence,319 the economic agreement short-circuits the process by 
which listeners grant or withhold their ideational currency. 
Each individual’s decision to deem an idea worth their time or 
an intermediary worth their trust is supposed to guide the mar-
ket’s “invisible hand” and allocate attentional market share ac-
cordingly.320 
 
of that same content. That does not mean, however, that the Constitution 
should protect unlimited expenditures for the purchase of attention itself. 
 318. This offers a response to those who argue that “there does not seem to 
be any justification for making a distinction between those who own a press or 
media outlet and those who want to rent one.” McGinnis, supra note 40, at 867. 
An owner of a media outlet must cultivate and retain attention; the renter of a 
media outlet does not. Of course, a media company owned by a benefactor with 
deep pockets might be capable of running in the red longer than another, but 
the more the owner disregards the attentional choices of consumers the sooner 
that owner will lose the underlying value of the asset altogether. 
 319. See generally CRESSMAN, supra note 223 (discussing the concept of 
“paid speech”); Ari Weisbard, Comment, Buying an Audience: Justifying the 
Regulation of Campaign Expenditures that Buy Access to Voters, 118 YALE L.J. 
379 (2008) (discussing the concept of payments for an audience). Once again, 
Citizens United offers an illustration. In addition to producing the movie and 
making it available on demand, the plaintiff sought to spend money on running 
two ten-second ads and one thirty-second ad on broadcast and cable television. 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010). The costs associated with 
producing those ads may be protected, but the costs associated with running 
those ads should not be. 
 320. One might object that consuming ad-supported content is a “package 
deal”: in exchange for receiving content I want to consume, I agree to tolerate 
content I did not necessarily want to consume. As such, the consumer’s atten-
tional choice is at least indirectly related to the choices of the intermediary and 
the content of the ads because the intermediary aims to strike a balance (in both 
ad frequency and content) that maximizes revenue while avoiding degrading 
the underlying product so much that it alienates consumers. See Wu, supra note 
50, at 789–90 (discussing the concept of “advertising load”). Indeed, there are 
“some well-known examples of advertising that have succeeded in minimizing 
or eliminating product degradation. The advertisements in fashion magazines 
like Vogue are considered by many readers to be part of the attraction.” Id. at 
789 n.87. 
  Nonetheless, even when an intermediary minimizes advertising load, 
the reputation it has cultivated remains key to the maintenance of audience 
attention. A Vogue ad receives our attention because it is in Vogue. The question 
is not whether intermediaries can run ads or whether viewers can strike that 
bargain, but whether a piece of content would have received exposure but for 
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This defining trait of success in the ideational market—con-
sumer choice—is medium- and technology-neutral.321 Newspa-
pers do not pay for you to read them; movies do not pay for you 
to watch them; Twitter does not pay for you to browse tweets. 
Whatever the era or the method of communication, a meaningful 
difference remains between content you choose to consume and 
content that advertisers pay to put in front of you. The former 
has succeeded in the marketplace of ideas; the latter has not. 
This interpretive touchstone does not mean that the “unique 
characteristics” of any given medium “should be ignored” when 
determining the constitutionality of regulations.322 The Court 
has previously recognized that the degree of affirmative choice 
exhibited by a reader or viewer might play a role in the market-
place of ideas and that the context of that choice might vary. In 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee, for example, a majority distinguished between the 
advertising found in newspapers and the advertising found on 
television, observing that “[w]ritten [advertisements] are not 
communicated unless they are read, and reading requires an af-
firmative act. Broadcast [advertisements], in contrast, are ‘in the 
air.’ . . . [They can be avoided] only by frequently leaving the 
room, changing the channel, or doing some other such affirma-
tive act.”323 The majority went so far as to call broadcast viewers 
a “captive audience” for advertisements.324 
The Court has since moved away from this kind of context- 
and choice-sensitive reasoning, but a deeper look at the market-
place of ideas justifies revisiting that doctrinal turn. In Citizens 
United, for example, Citizens United itself suggested that the 
Court could invalidate the challenged law “as applied to movies 
shown through video on-demand” without invaliding it with re-
spect to ads because viewers of on-demand content “select[] a 
 
the payment made to the intermediary who has cultivated the attentional de-
mand. If not, then its increased exposure stems primarily from economic pur-
chase, not attentional value.  
 321. “Advertising-based business models have always valued ‘time on de-
vice,’ whether the device be a television or a magazine.” Langvardt, supra note 
281, at 135. There may be important differences between how magazines, tele-
vision, and social media go about earning attention, but the basis of the compe-
tition is the same. See supra text accompanying notes 287–89; infra text accom-
panying notes 322–29. 
 322. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994). 
 323. 412 U.S. 94, 128 (1973) (quoting Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100–
01 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). 
 324. Id. at 127. 
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program after taking ‘a series of affirmative steps.’”325 Advertis-
ing spots, on the other hand, “reach viewers who have chosen a 
channel or a program for reasons unrelated to the advertis-
ing.”326 The Court waved this argument away, claiming that it 
had no authority to say “what means of speech should be pre-
ferred or disfavored” and stating that it must “decline to draw, 
and then redraw, constitutional lines based on the particular 
media or technology used.”327 But this explanation is both non-
responsive and makes little sense from a market perspective. 
Saying that a viewer’s “affirmative act” in choosing content 
is irrelevant to the marketplace of ideas is like saying that a con-
sumer’s “affirmative act” in buying a product is irrelevant to the 
economic marketplace. If consumer choice plays no role, there is 
no market. Nor does subjecting the vehicle of advertising to dif-
ferent scrutiny involve disfavoring certain “means of speech”: a 
speaker can post a thirty-second video online where it must be 
affirmatively sought out by viewers or a speaker can place that 
video in an advertisement and thereby “reach viewers who have 
chosen a channel or a program for reasons unrelated to the ad-
vertising.”328 Both the message and the means (video) are iden-
tical—what has changed are the terms upon which that video 
has accessed the attention of the viewer. Consumer choice re-
mains a durable touchstone regardless of the era’s preferred me-
dia or technology.329 
 
 325. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 326 (2010).  
 326. Id.  
 327. Id. at 326–27. 
 328. Id. at 326. 
 329. To be fair, a court’s analysis under an attentional-choice framework 
might differ depending upon “the particular media or technology” at issue in 
any given case. But this would not be because the medium or technology deserve 
categorically different treatment. See, e.g., supra note 40 (critiquing the Court’s 
unique treatment of broadcasting spectrum based on the “scarcity rationale”). 
Rather, the Court’s approach to the medium or technology at issue would re-
main consistently grounded in the principle of consumer choice.  
  Because the law challenged in Citizens United was not designed around 
this principle, the opinion itself never meaningfully engages with this distinc-
tion. See, e.g., 558 U.S. at 325–27 (finding the movie at issue to be, “in essence,” 
a “feature-length negative advertisement” because it was “equivalent to express 
advocacy” under the challenged law); id. at 364 (“Today, 30-second television 
ads may be the most effective way to convey a political message. . . . Soon, how-
ever, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web 
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Earning exposure is difficult, but the discipline of the mar-
ket serves an important purpose. A charlatan who sells worth-
less or dangerous goods deserves to go out of business. So too 
does one who trades in bankrupt ideas deserve to find himself 
hawking his wares to an empty room. The fact that nonsense 
cannot spread far and wide is not a violation of rights, it’s a tri-
umph of decentralized discretion. The fact that some ideas may 
find their circulation diminished is not a failure of the market, it 
is the market’s central feature.  
None of this is to say advertisements are inherently “bad” or 
lack value.330 A reasonable degree of access to advertising might 
help a good idea gain an initial exposure that would not other-
wise be possible. Similarly, a reasonable degree of access to ad-
vertising might help “outsiders” get a foothold in the market-
place of ideas and help prevent consolidation of attentional 
control by the largest, most popular, or most well-established 
speakers or intermediaries. More instrumentally, many content 
platforms (newspaper, radio, television, social media, etc.) are 
built on advertising revenues,331 and these platforms give con-
sumers access to information that they have chosen in the mar-
ketplace of ideas. A wide range of expenditures protected under 
the “free trade” principle would dry up as a practical matter ab-
sent some protection for advertising revenues. 
Unlike the high level of constitutional protection accorded to 
expressive expenditures or distributive expenditures, however, 
 
sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candi-
dates and issues.”). 
  Were Congress to make the attentional-choice distinction between ad-
vertisements and movies explicit in its legislation, however, the Court would 
need to confront it. A speaker will rarely pay to have an audience watch a fea-
ture-length film—this is a real and meaningful difference between Hillary: The 
Movie and an attack ad run on TV. Of course, if a consumer chooses to watch a 
feature-length film that effectively functions as a plug for a political candidate, 
a political position, or even a commercial product, then that speaker deserves 
the fruits of their labor and their attendant exposure in the marketplace of 
ideas. See, e.g., Noah Kristula-Green, Opinion, The Lego Movie Isn’t a Great 
Film, It’s a Brilliant Commercial, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www 
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/19/lego-movie-is-great-commerical 
[https://perma.cc/VFM2-8FRX].  
 330. See, e.g., Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Prob-
lem, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 31), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3374370 (noting that even “image ads” that do not convey much infor-
mation “possess the capacity to shape public attitudes”). 
 331. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Infor-
mation Age, 127 YALE L.J. 2270, 2336 n.324 (2018). 
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advertising expenditures deserve only minimal constitutional 
protection. This is because allowing content to propagate 
through advertising inherently implicates competitive trade-
offs. The initial exposure that a limited degree of advertising pro-
vides may enhance democratic competition and be worthwhile as 
a policy matter,332 but it is still unrelated to the underlying con-
tent’s success in the marketplace of ideas. The more one is al-
lowed to gain ideational exposure through economic power alone, 
the less we are truly promoting free competition between ideas.  
Thus, allowing a speaker to purchase unlimited amounts of 
attentional exposure despite his content’s repeated failure to 
earn wider circulation does nothing to honor the First Amend-
ment. If anything, extending strong constitutional protection to 
practices that undermine the power of attentional choice insu-
lates conduct by private actors that pose threats to individual 
autonomy and democratic self-governance rivaling that which 
animated the First Amendment. 
On an individual level, “our life experience will equal what 
we have paid attention to.”333 When we do not control our atten-
tion, our life is not our own.334 And while our social groups, as-
sociations, and informational intermediaries influence us in 
ways we may not anticipate through their access to our atten-
tion, we are a voluntary participant in such relationships—cul-
tivating, shaping, and deciding who retains this access. These 
choices reflect the ongoing trust so vital to knowledge-generation 
and formation of the self.335 
Attention transactions, on the other hand, enhance the 
power of ideational producers at the cost of consumers’ own au-
tonomy, agency, and self-development. Unlike almost any other 
party vying for access to our attention, advertisers can leapfrog 
the competition, reach through the intermediaries we have cho-
sen, and strike us like a bolt from the blue based on economic 
 
 332. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 431–37. 
 333. WU, supra note 41, at 7 (attributing the observation to William James). 
 334. See CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 11–13 (“Attention is the thing that is 
most one’s own: in the normal course of things, we choose what to pay attention 
to, and in a very real sense this determines what is real for us; what is actually 
present to our consciousness. Appropriations of our attention are then an espe-
cially intimate matter.”).  
 335. See generally Hardwig, supra note 48 (discussing the role of trust in 
knowledge and rationality). 
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might alone. Any such purported right to buy access does noth-
ing to empower the listener or enhance the dignitary interests 
protected by a “right to receive” information.336 
Indeed, when one learns just how malleable our identities 
are and how indeterminate our preferences are in the hands of 
someone who has access to our attention,337 it seems truly per-
verse to privilege the advertiser’s power to buy this access over 
the citizen’s power to protect it from abuse. Advertisers gain this 
intimate access—this critical entry point to the development of 
the self—without ever needing to earn the trust of the target. 
Given the Framers’ central concern with protecting our freedom 
of conscience and thought,338 the First Amendment should not 
be read to confer such a fundamental and formative power upon 
those who have not earned our trust. 
On a societal level, such transactions distort the direction 
and tenor of our political dialogue and the order of the legislative 
agenda. Rather than being driven by those issues which arise 
through consumer attentional choices and the organic, diffuse, 
and diverse concerns of the public, our national conversation is 
distorted by those with the economic power to purchase exposure 
and bump their priorities to the top of our collective attention. 
When ten people account for over twenty percent of federal PAC 
donations,339 for example, the power of the public to drive the 
direction of debate is diminished—and the bigger the ad buy, the 
bigger the anticompetitive effect.  
 
 336. When the government tries to insert itself directly between speaker and 
listener, the “free trade” principle protects the “right to receive” such infor-
mation. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408–09 (1974) (holding 
that censorship of outgoing mail sent by prison inmates infringes the rights of 
non-inmates to whom the correspondence was addressed), overruled on other 
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). An advertising contract, 
however, is not between a speaker and listener—it is between a speaker and an 
intermediary with access to the listener. If a “right to advertise” is, in actuality, 
a “right to contract for the attention of another person,” then a “right to receive 
advertising” would be a nonsensical “right to have one’s attention purchased in 
a third-party transaction.” But see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976).  
 337. See supra Part I.B; infra Part V. 
 338. See Campbell, supra note 104, at 280–81. 
 339. See Fredreka Schouten & Christopher Schnaars, 10 Super-Rich People 
Dominate Giving to Super PACs Active in Midterm Elections for Congress, USA 




2222 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2157 
 
Consider again the $91 million in political advertising ex-
penditures above. A reasonable limitation on this amount would 
silence no speaker,340 prevent no idea from entering the mar-
ket,341 interfere with no press expenditure,342 restrain no free 
ideational competition,343 and pose no inherent risk of a creeping 
government censor.344 Of course, the specific structure and de-
sign of such a limitation would raise important constitutional 
questions, but the limitation itself does not strike at the heart of 
what the First Amendment was designed to protect. Any person 
(natural or otherwise) would remain free to express their opinion 
on any political issue, spend unlimited amounts of money on po-
litical speech, and expend limitless funds to make any idea freely 
available to every person. How widely that idea spreads from 
there, however, is for the market to decide. 
The Court’s decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti is instructive. In Bellotti, a group of banking associations 
and business corporations “wanted to spend money to publicize 
their views opposing a referendum proposal” that would allow 
for a graduated income tax.345 The Court did not base its decision 
on “whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights;” ra-
ther, it gave the appellants’ advertisements constitutional cover 
based on the “inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capac-
ity for informing the public.”346 The Court recognized that “cor-
porate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote” but 
 
 340. Such a regulation would not reach expenditures for the creation of any 
underlying content. See supra note 294. Nor would such regulation undermine 
the importance of “serendipitous” encounters with information that we might 
not normally encounter through our chosen intermediaries. Because deference 
to attentional choices does nothing to silence the wide variety of speakers we 
must (and should!) encounter in our everyday experience, see supra note 294, 
the theory would not allow the government to restrain genuinely serendipitous 
exposure to new ideas, whether from a demonstration in a park, an advocate on 
a street corner, or otherwise. To be sure, it would impact which messages might 
reach us through advertising, but there is hardly anything “serendipitous” 
about someone buying access to you.  
 341. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 342. See supra Part III.B.2.  
 343. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 344. See Neuborne, supra note 62, at 902 (noting that “fear of the govern-
ment as censor” is “[b]ehind much of the Supreme Court rhetoric in First 
Amendment cases”). 
 345. 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).  
 346. Id. at 776–77. 
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argued that “the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate 
is hardly a reason to suppress it.”347 
One need not question the “inherent worth” of the banks’ 
perspective to challenge the propriety of using advertising to 
skew the public debate. By treating all expenditures the same, 
the Bellotti Court conflated the right to buy an audience with the 
right to speak at all. A bank is free to post its position on the 
referendum or send out a press release. The bank’s employees, 
shareholders, or others in the community who might be impacted 
are free to share this position and disseminate it among family 
and friends. If the bank’s position is actually persuasive, then it 
will spread and properly “influence the outcome of the vote.”348 
But if the bank’s view is not persuasive, it deserves no greater 
attention or influence than an equally persuasive counterargu-
ment would earn. As Chief Justice Roberts recognized in Ben-
nett, the view that gets exposure is necessarily more effective 
than the view that does not.349 Even if corporations have a right 
to “speak,” they need not have a right to circumvent competition 
in the marketplace of ideas. 
The problem is not, therefore, that advertising causes the 
views of the wealthy and powerful to “drown out” other points of 
view.350 Attentional purchases do not “drown out” contrary views 
“in the sense that those who wish to hear them cannot”—such 
views are still available.351 Rather, attentional purchases let 
those with economic power circumvent the rigorous competition 
usually required to earn exposure. This allows particular per-
spectives to “surge to the top” of our collective attention and be-
come salient in a way divorced from their ideational value, their 
relative priority, the needs and concerns of the individual and 
the community, and the natural corrective dynamics at play in 
our network of trusted intermediaries.352 Any idea has the latent 
ability “to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” 
by earning the attention of the community, but only some ideas 
are pushed unearned (and often uncontested) to the front of our 
 
 347. Id. at 790–91. 
 348. Id. at 790. 
 349. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 
750 (2011). 
 350. Id. at 789. 
 351. Fried, supra note 4, at 252. 
 352. See ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 75.  
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personal and communal consciousness on the basis of the 
speaker’s economic resources alone.353  
“But surely,” one might say, “it is better for one side in a 
political debate to be heard than none at all.” Not so. Given our 
limited attentional capacity as participants in our democracy 
(and our elected officials’ limited attentional capacity as repre-
sentatives), only those ideas that naturally drive our attention 
and engagement should translate into societal exposure and po-
litical action. That is the implicit assumption at the core of the 
marketplace of ideas.354 
For when political advertisers’ ideas are artificially given 
broader exposure, the concerns of real communities are left un-
attended to. If political attentional purchases were pared back, 
more diffuse and organic topics might drive the political debate 
and the legislative calendar—all without harm to anyone’s abil-
ity to express themselves or make their views available for all to 
hear.  
None of this turns upon any adverse judgments about the 
content of political ads, their persuasiveness, or the decisional 
criteria of those who might act based on such ads. This point is 
worth emphasizing since scholars in the past have objected to 
“aggressive, simple-minded television spots”355 that appeal “to a 
consumer’s emotion rather than to his intellect.”356 However re-
grettable one might find fear-mongering attack ads, however, 
such arguments are problematic. 
To start, these objections are “profoundly inegalitarian.”357 
Who is to judge the “right” metrics for evaluating candidates?358 
Each of us votes based on different criteria and saying that an 
appeal should be limited because it is only fluff (or bile) is to posit 
oneself the true arbiter of legitimate political discourse. 
Casting aspersions upon the decisions of a “civic slacker” 
(i.e., someone who goes as far as possible to avoid political con-
versations but eventually votes based on the emotional appeal of 
 
 353. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). 
 354. See supra Part I.C. 
 355. Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 
17, 1996), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1996/10/17/the-curse-of-american 
-politics/ [https://perma.cc/U2TZ-W9RB]. 
 356. Ortiz, supra note 51, at 903.  
 357. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999).  
 358. Ortiz, supra note 51, at 902–14.  
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a thirty-second spot)359 isn’t just self-aggrandizing—it’s self-de-
luding to boot. The purported divide between reason and emotion 
is more ephemeral than one might imagine,360 and individuals 
with higher levels of education and political engagement are the 
worst perpetrators of identity-motivated reasoning.361 All of us 
are susceptible to emotional appeals; those “in the know” are just 
better at rationalizing preexisting biases.362 
Under an attentional-choice theory of competition, the basis 
for the regulation is not the emotional nature of the content, but 
the unequal terms of access afforded to the purchaser of the 
viewer’s attention. If the First Amendment protects the alloca-
tion of attentional market share based on success in the market-
place of ideas, then an economic transaction to purchase the 
viewer’s attention violates the terms by which the First Amend-
ment presupposes that viewers will be exposed to political infor-
mation. After all, if a civic slacker “goes as far as possible to avoid 
[politics],”363 then it should be extra difficult to reach and ani-
mate this voter if we respect their agency, autonomy, and deci-
sional criteria. The fact that economic power becomes the only 
way to access such a voter reflects a profound market failure.  
Recognizing this anticompetitive dynamic also makes the 
parallels between government action and private action clear. A 
purported “private right to unlimited attention” is offensive in 
the same way a purported “state power to cap distribution” is 
offensive: both interfere with free ideational competition to “tilt 
public debate in a preferred direction.”364  
In other words, the libertarian position is animated by an 
“equalizing” interest of its own: the power to have equal exposure 
and influence despite having uncompetitive ideas. Professor 
Brad Smith—a staunch defender of the laissez-faire position—
argues that “[m]oney is how people who lack talent participate” 
 
 359. See id. at 902.  
 360. See supra Part I.B.  
 361. See ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 294 (noting that “political ra-
tionalization is often most powerful among people who are well-informed and 
politically engaged”).  
 362. See id. This is not to say there is no (or can be no) difference between 
routine emotional appeals and algorithm-driven tailoring when it comes to the 
concept of “attentional-choice.” The intersection between attention, emotion, 
technology, and volition is an area of study that should inform any doctrinal 
developments in this direction. 
 363. Ortiz, supra note 51, at 902.  
 364. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 578–79 (2011).  
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in politics.365 Such opponents of reform argue that “inequalities 
in talents in writing and speaking” could “translate into inequal-
ities in political power.”366  
First of all, it seems odd to claim that those who lack per-
suasive talents should be able to “win” more exposure in a mar-
ketplace of ideas. Even so, libertarians have nothing to fear: a 
restriction on attentional purchases would not prohibit those 
who lack “talents in writing” from spending unlimited cash on 
hiring a crack team of marketing gurus to craft the perfect pitch. 
Whether that pitch earns the attention of the audience and gen-
erates further exposure through persuasion rather than contin-
ued purchase, however, is up to the market.  
An operating theory of ideational competition also explains 
why it is unproblematic to leave unregulated “non-pecuniary 
forms of contribution . . . in the form of time spent making phone 
calls or knocking on doors.”367 Time spent making phone calls 
and knocking on doors represents the highest democratic ideal 
and reflects the virtues of the content conveyed and the candi-
date supported. That “[c]ontributions in the form of time . . . can 
be dramatically unequal among political candidates” is a func-
tion of market share made manifest: consumers deciding that 
certain ideas and certain candidates deserve their time and at-
tention.368  
Simply put, not all ideas deserve to have equal influence. 
“[A] right of free speech naturally leads to unequal influence.”369 
Popular messages gain wide—and unequal—exposure by earn-
ing our attention and prompting us to share with others. We are 
all producer, gatekeeper, and consumer. Only by recognizing the 
importance of our diffuse decisions to speak, share, and select 
does a marketplace of ideas have any meaning. Anyone who has 
the money to buy an audience outright and says that “he wel-
comes full and fair debate is no more to be believed than the en-
trenched monopolist who says he welcomes full and fair compe-
tition.”370 
 
 365. KUHNER, supra note 23, at 175. 
 366. Id. at 262 (quoting JOHN SAMPLES, THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCE REFORM (2006)). 
 367. Muller, supra note 176. 
 368. Id. 
 369. McGinnis, supra note 40, at 846. 
 370. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  
  
2020] FIGHTING FOR ATTENTION 2227 
 
ii. Public Interference 
An attentional-marketplace theory of the First Amendment 
also explains the canon of campaign finance cases in a more 
meaningful way. Buckley v. Valeo is the easiest to understand: 
the statute used broad language that regulated all “expendi-
tures” as an undifferentiated class based on the specific political 
content expressed.371 This had enormous consequences for the 
creation and distribution of political content (where protections 
should be at their highest) and, therefore, placed enormous 
weight on where the statutory line was drawn (i.e., how the cov-
ered content was defined).372  
Under an attentional-choice approach, the problems with 
the law are clear. Capping all expenditures based on the specific 
content of the expression violates the “more speech” principle (by 
restricting the entry of content into the market) as well as the 
“free trade” principle (by restraining the ability of valued content 
to expand its audience). Such a law severely restricts the “unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open” debate protected by the market-
place of ideas.373 
Citizens United is of a piece. Although Congress attempted 
to narrow its regulations after Buckley, the resulting scheme did 
not align well with a supposed interest in preventing corruption 
(or at least an interest in quid pro quo corruption).374 Nor could 
the government identify a meaningful line between the corporate 
expenditures reached by the law and the corporate expenditures 
of media and publishing companies.375 When the government 
was pressed at oral argument on whether it had the power to 
ban a book in the lead up to an election and the attorney failed 
to respond with an unequivocal and resounding “no,” the fate of 
the case was sealed.376 
The theory above provides this line. The line does not run 
between types of corporate forms or the likelihood of an expendi-
ture inducing corruption. Instead it runs between content the 
market demands and content it does not. This avoids the “media 
 
 371. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39–40 (1976) (per curiam). 
 372. See id. at 40–44. 
 373. Id. at 14 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).  
 374. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010). 
 375. See id. at 351.  
 376. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–29, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
310 (No. 08-205). 
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exemption trap.” Usually, if Congress “exempt[s] media corpora-
tions from campaign expenditures regulations[,] . . . the Court 
claims that Congress has engaged in unconstitutional speaker 
discrimination.”377 If Congress does include media corporations, 
however, “the Court accuses it of violating basic press free-
doms.”378 Congress is “damned if it does and damned if it 
doesn’t.”379 
By respecting the importance of attentional choice, the the-
ory herein would allow Congress to draw a more neutral line that 
honors press freedoms while letting consumers decide for them-
selves who constitutes the press. Such an approach would also 
help anticipate any changes in the media environment since the 
fundamental attention-purchasing dynamics of advertising have 
remained generally stable over time.  
An attentional-choice approach would also address the com-
mon complaint that media companies have “outsized influence” 
compared to other businesses. Of course they do—they are in the 
business of maintaining attention. The fact that “[m]edia com-
panies can run procandidate editorials as easily as non-media 
corporations can pay for advertisements”380 is irrelevant. Con-
sumers in the marketplace choose to read editorials because they 
consider the opinions valuable.381 Advertisements purchased to 
run alongside those editorials bear no such indicia of market-
driven value. To suggest that the media’s influence is “outsized” 
is to question the market’s assessment of ideational merit and 
speaker credibility.  
Refining the “more speech” and “free trade” principles in the 
way outlined above also threads a needle through prior prece-
dent in a much more careful and tailored manner. Despite the 
 
 377. Sonja R. West, The Media Exemption Puzzle of Campaign Finance 
Laws, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 253, 253 (2016). 
 378. Id. 
 379. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 474 n.75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 380. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 283 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 381. Editorials are particularly important because they arise within the con-
text of a trusting, voluntary informational relationship. As discussed above, “the 
best way to combat political misperceptions is through the use of ‘surprising 
validators,’ meaning individuals and institutions that are credible to persons 
operating under the misperception(s) in question.” Strong, supra note 76, at 
141–42. For example, when a traditionally liberal publication or organization 
offers a conservative endorsement (or vice versa) the unexpected nature of the 
endorsement and the preexisting reservoir of goodwill and trust is what makes 
the statement so meaningful, powerful, and persuasive.  
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Supreme Court’s occasionally broad and inconsistent use of 
words like “dissemination”382 and “communications”383 (which 
sweep in all kinds of diverse and distinguishable conduct), the 
Court has always been most troubled by government interfer-
ence with discussion and debate among individuals384 and gov-
ernment interference with media that has been selected by the 
listener. These cherished First Amendment activities are inter-
active and social, with ideas disseminating based on their atten-
tional value and citizens developing a culture of political involve-
ment and democratic engagement in the process.385 Under such 
a view, natural persons are indispensable to the tenor of the de-
bate and the direction of the nation.386  
For example, almost every single illustration the Court has 
provided regarding activities that should receive strong judicial 
protection would continue to receive such protection under the 
“more speech” and “free trade” principles above: “the National 
Rifle Association publish[ing] a book urging the public to vote for 
the challenger because the incumbent U.S. Senator supports a 
handgun ban”387; “the American Civil Liberties Union creat[ing] 
a Web site telling the public to vote for a Presidential candidate 
in light of that candidate’s defense of free speech”388; individuals 
or associations of any kind producing “[m]odern day movies, tel-
evision comedies, or skits on Youtube.com [that] portray public 
 
 382. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (using the term 
“dissemination” to describe distribution and attention-purchase). 
 383. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 758 (1976) (using the term “communication” to describe ex-
pression, distribution, and attention-purchase). 
 384. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (per curiam). 
 385. See CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, CORPORATE CITIZEN?: AN ARGUMENT 
FOR THE SEPARATION OF CORPORATION AND STATE 271 (2016) (“[D]emocracy 
forces society to come together and deliberate. Instead of attempting to change 
laws and government by means of violence and threats, democracy elevates the 
importance of debate . . . .” (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks at the In-
augural Sandra Day O’Connor Distinguished Lecture Series, 41 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1169, 1170 (2007))). 
 386. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (“The right of 
free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was . . . , in Madison’s 
view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government.”); see also 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (stating that “[t]he “mainte-
nance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government 
may be responsive to the will of the people is a “fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system.” (emphasis added)). 
 387. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010). 
 388. Id. 
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officials or public policies in unflattering ways”389; the publishing 
of “a campaign biography that [i]s the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy”390; the drawing or publishing of political car-
toons391; or “speaking or writing in support of any candidate” by 
“any single powerful group” or set of associations.392  
All of these are examples of activities involving expression 
or distribution, with their underlying expenditures necessary to 
enter the marketplace of ideas and compete for the attention of 
the reader, viewer, or listener. Only one of the Court’s hypothet-
icals from Citizens United would be open to any kind of regula-
tion at all: the “Sierra Club run[ning] an ad . . . that exhorts the 
public to disapprove of a Congressman who favors logging in na-
tional forests.”393 Depending on the regulations adopted this ad 
might or might not still air,394 but either way the Sierra Club 
would remain free to post the video on its website, share the 
video on social media, and engage concerned citizens in innumer-
able other people-powered ways that do not involve the outright 
purchase of access to attention. 
In other words, armed with more precise language, better-
tailored regulations, and a new compelling interest, the govern-
ment could potentially find ways to regulate independent politi-
cal advertising expenditures (in order to prevent private re-
straints of trade) even if it lacked the power under Buckley and 
Citizens United to regulate expenditures that are protected un-
der the “more speech” and “free trade” principles. 
An attentional-market theory would also begin to explain 
(and cabin the scope of) one of the Court’s more cryptic cam-
paign-finance cases discussed above: Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.395 In Bennett, the Court 
struck down an initiative passed by the voters that created a vol-
 
 389. Id. at 371–72. 
 390. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 
08-205).  
 391. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 483 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 392. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 393. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337. 
 394. A law might, for example, require that political attention expenditures 
be funded by small donations—meaning that an organization that builds broad 
support has greater leeway to run ads. 
 395. 564 U.S. 721 (2011). 
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untary public financing system to fund the campaigns of candi-
dates for state office.396 Candidates were provided an initial al-
lotment and additional matching funds were triggered if a pri-
vately financed candidate’s expenditures (combined with 
independent expenditures in support of that candidate) exceeded 
the initial allotment of state funds to the publicly financed can-
didate.397 Once the triggering threshold was met, each additional 
private dollar spent (by the candidate or by an outside group) 
generated a dollar of public funding for each publicly funded can-
didate.398 
The dissent399 (along with many in the legal community400) 
argued there was simply no free-speech burden to be found.  
Public-finance programs—unlike caps on private spending—add 
“more speech” to the market.401 They “level up” rather than 
“level down.”402 How could a system like Arizona’s possibly pose 
any First Amendment problem? 
 The majority opinion in Bennett, however, reflects a Court 
beginning to wrestle with the reality of limited and mediated at-
tention. “More speech,” it turns out, isn’t the only relevant prin-
ciple in the marketplace of ideas. So is “free trade.” And just as 
private attentional purchases that go unrebutted might distort 
the ideational market and hinder free competition, so too might 
the kind of subsidy found in Bennett. Unlike voucher or dona-
tion-matching subsidies (which are neutral to or aligned with 
public interest and support), the Arizona statute had the unique 
(albeit unlikely) potential to disrupt “free trade” and chill “more 
speech.” 
Consider a candidate whose ideas are popular and who 
wants to spend additional funds to help develop and satisfy the 
demand for her ideas. The speaker could be put in a bind: she 
can continue to speak and spread her ideas (and risk strength-
ening the hand of an opponent, who could use the funds on at-
tentional purchases and artificial exposure), or she can cease 
 
 396. Id. at 728. 
 397. Id. at 729. 
 398. Id. at 729–30. 
 399. Id. at 763–67 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 400. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, 
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 84–93 
(2016). 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. 
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spending (which might curb the spread of her ideas despite their 
natural attentional value). 
To be clear, the facts in Bennett are not so sympathetic and 
the Supreme Court’s sudden rediscovery of the “free trade” prin-
ciple in a case about public finance may reflect little more than 
an extension of the Court’s fuzzy laissez-faire reasoning. The hy-
pothetical above shows that a threat to free speech and free trade 
would only arise if a public candidate spent disproportionately 
on access to attention rather than expression or distribution. The 
Court did not focus on this dynamic at all and cited no evidence 
of such a risk. The more likely scenario (and apparently the one 
that occurred403) is that the private candidate would spend heav-
ily on attentional purchases and find little reason to be deterred 
by matching funds given to opponents. Nonetheless, by making 
total-spend the trigger, the law at least had the potential to chill 
robust, merited competition. 
The legal principles, competitive dynamics, and reckoning 
with reality found in Bennett point toward a recognition that 
government intervention and private behavior have the poten-
tial to distort the ideational market. These are two sides of the 
same coin. And just as the Court prohibits anticompetitive gov-
ernment action under the First Amendment, Congress has the 
power to curb anticompetitive private action. 
IV.  LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTIONS: PROMOTING 
COMPETITION AND PREVENTING MARKET 
INTERFERENCE 
The First Amendment provides protections “both personal 
and structural.”404 Its language tracks an “inside-to-outside 
axis,”405 guarding “the evolution of a democratic idea from its 
genesis in the interior recesses of a free citizen’s con-
science . . . to [the] transform[ation] [of] the idea into law.”406 
Our decentralized decisions to read and to share—to invest time 
in an idea and deem it worthy of the time of others—is how this 
 
 403. An empirical study later confirmed that private spending was not 
chilled by the law. See Conor M. Dowling et al., Does Public Financing Chill 
Political Speech? Exploiting a Court Injunction as a Natural Experiment, 11 
ELECTION L.J. 302 (2012). 
 404. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1682 (2015) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). 
 405. NEUBORNE, supra note 59, at 17. 
 406. Id. at 20. 
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transformation occurs and how value is conferred in a free soci-
ety.407 This interest in the free flow of valued information “may 
be defeated by private restraints no less than by public censor-
ship.”408 As the Supreme Court has observed: 
[A] command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow 
of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they 
impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed free-
dom. . . . [Freedom] from governmental interference under the First 
Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private 
interests. The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for 
the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views 
has any constitutional immunity.409 
The competitive functioning of the marketplace of ideas can be 
threatened by authoritarians and oligarchs alike.410 And any 
First Amendment doctrine that hopes to be relevant to the chal-
lenges posed by our modern information- and attention-econo-
mies will need to focus less on what government cannot do and 
more on what government can do.411 
Promoting competition between ideas and safeguarding 
genuine attentional choice against public and private abuses 
would protect the freedom of thought and conscience that the 
Framers believed to be our most intimate and inalienable 
right.412 In the campaign-finance and election-protection space 
in particular, focusing on attentional-choice might allow a mired 
debate to move beyond “corruption” and “political equality.”413 
 
 407. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1944) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . presupposes that right conclusions 
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any 
kind of authoritative selection.” (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 
F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))). 
 408. Id. at 28–29 (Roberts, J., dissenting); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately pre-
vail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be 
by the Government itself or a private [participant].”).  
 409. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20. 
 410. See Schouten & Schnaars, supra note 339 (noting that donations from 
ten individuals accounted “for more than 20% of the money filling the bank ac-
counts of federal super PACs”). 
 411. See Wu, supra note 214, at 284–91. 
 412. See Campbell, supra note 104, at 280–81. 
 413. See supra Part III.A. McCutcheon includes a passage that seems to sug-
gest any interest other than quid pro quo corruption is foreclosed. McCutcheon 
v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014). This should not be considered a holding of law. 
Article III prohibits the Court from issuing an advisory opinion about hypothet-
ical interests that might be proffered in future disputes over as-of-yet-unwritten 
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Unlike a government interest in preventing corruption or pro-
moting equal political influence (which must be weighed against 
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment), an interest in 
protecting ideational competition reinforces the purposes of the 
First Amendment.414  
An “attention antitrust” could lead to more speech, more 
competition, and more respect for our autonomy as speakers and 
listeners. The nation’s economic antitrust laws “were enacted for 
‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’”415 A law that 
promotes ideational competition would no more “pick winners 
and losers,” “equalize speech,” or “discriminate against certain 
speakers or viewpoints” any more than the antitrust laws pick 
winners and losers, equalize market share, or discriminate 
against particular businesses or products. Such laws only ensure 
that dominant market positions stem from victory earned in a 
competitive market. In such a market, our individual and inde-
pendent decisions about what to consume, recommend, and 
share drive demand and drive public debate.416 
A broad accounting of permissible legislative action under 
an attentional-choice theory of the First Amendment is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, recognizing the nature of 
the issues (and identifying a framework for addressing them) 
could clarify the government’s basis for various reforms. A gov-
ernment interest in encouraging the creation of diverse content 
 
laws. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church 
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). Thus, while it may be true that “pre-
venting corruption . . . [is] the only legitimate and compelling government in-
terest[ ] thus far identified for restricting campaign finances,” FEC v. Nat’l Con-
servative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985) (emphasis added), it 
need not be the only one. 
 414. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20 (“It would be strange indeed . . . if the 
grave concern for freedom of the press [and freedom of speech] which prompted 
adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the gov-
ernment was without power to protect th[ose] freedom[s].”); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1976) (per curiam) (“[C]ongressional effort[s], not to abridge, 
restrict, or censor speech, but rather . . . to facilitate and enlarge public discus-
sion and participation in the electoral process, [serve] goals vital to a self-gov-
erning people. [Such laws] further[ ], not abridge[ ], pertinent First Amendment 
values.”). 
 415. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 n.14 (1984) 
(quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)). 
 416. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (“[T]he preserva-
tion of a free society is so far dependent upon the right of each individual citizen 
to receive such literature as he himself might desire . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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and promoting robust competition could provide additional sup-
port for public subsidies,417 more rigorous antitrust enforce-
ment,418 and data portability or interoperability require-
ments.419 A government interest in protecting genuine 
attentional volition might justify regulating habit-forming de-
sign,420 imposing overridable time-out requirements,421 or ex-
ploring other approaches tailored to addressing demonstrable at-
tentional-choice constraints.422  
Perhaps most importantly, if the Supreme Court recognized 
that advertising transactions afford unequal terms of access to 
attention, it could open the door to new legislative interventions. 
Current First Amendment doctrine threatens almost any law 
that might purport to regulate political advertising or political 
ad expenditures.423 But current doctrine fails to account for how 
advertising allows the economic power of third parties to com-
mandeer channels of communication that were never opened to 
them by the choices of consumers in the marketplace of ideas. 
These choices confer an enormous amount of trust and power,424 
and for advertisers that trust and power is entirely unearned. 
This dynamic makes advertising particularly amenable to mar-
ket-structuring regulations. But what should those regulations 
be? 
The major online platforms—Facebook, Google, and Twit-
ter—are in the midst of showcasing a variety of different ap-
proaches to handling online advertising and political advertising 
 
 417. See infra note 465. 
 418. See Wu, supra note 50, at 793–99. 
 419. See, e.g., Bennett Cyphers & Danny O’Brien, Facing Facebook: Data 
Portability and Interoperability Are Anti-Monopoly Medicine, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (July 24, 2018), https://eff.org/deeplinks/2018/07/facing 
-facebook-data-portability-and-interoperability-are-anti-monopoly-medicine 
[https://perma.cc/M3FG-2STS]. 
 420. See Langvardt, supra note 281, at 131–33. 
 421. Id. at 159–60. 
 422. See supra text accompanying notes 287–92. 
 423. See, e.g., Nate Persily & Alex Stamos, Regulating Online Political Ad-
vertising by Foreign Governments and Nationals, in SECURING AMERICAN ELEC-
TIONS: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF 
THE 2020 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND BEYOND 27, 28 (Michael McFaul 
ed., 2019) (noting that “serious constitutional constraints rightly limit available 
options” for regulating issue advocacy). 
 424. See supra Parts I.A–B. 
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in particular.425 Following Facebook’s announcement in late 
2019 that it would not fact-check advertisements purchased by 
politicians,426 Twitter’s CEO, Jack Dorsey, announced that Twit-
ter would “stop all political advertising” on its platform because 
“political message reach should be earned, not bought.”427 For all 
the nuance and context that Dorsey’s initial tweet lacked,428 his 
central message reflected an important insight: there is a differ-
ence between “free expression” and “paying for reach.”429 More 
specifically, there is a difference between “earned reach” and 
“paid reach.” Like earned media and paid advertising, both pro-
vide exposure but on very different terms.430  
An attentional-choice theory would give this conceptual dis-
tinction constitutional significance. When an advertiser is “pay-
ing for reach,” the terms of that reach are amenable to regulation 
consistent with the First Amendment. Yet recognizing this dis-
tinction is only half the battle—the other half is implementation. 
An attentional-choice theory suggests that Congress can legis-
late with respect to political advertising, not necessarily how it 
should. Policies in this area will have profound effects and any 
legislative intervention should receive careful interdisciplinary 
consideration before enactment.  
 
 425. See Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK, https:// 
facebook.com/business/help/1838453822893854 [https://perma.cc/RYK9 
-HM8U]; An Update on Our Political Ads Policy, GOOGLE (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://blog.google/technology/ads/update-our-political-ads-policy/ [https:// 
perma.cc/E6TG-SKY3]; Political Content, TWITTER (Nov. 20, 2019), https:// 
business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/prohibited-content-policies/political 
-content.html [https://perma.cc/ZGV8-3JML]. 
 426. See Emily Stewart, Facebook’s Political Ads Policy Is Predictably Turn-
ing Out To Be a Disaster, VOX (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://vox.com/recode/ 
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-warren-aoc [https://perma.cc/8BD2-RJSS]. 
 427. Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/jack/status/1189634360472829952 [https://perma.cc/569U-2Y48]. 
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Emily Stewart, Twitter Is Walking into a Minefield with Its Political Ads Ban, 
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-45EB].  
 429. Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM), https:// 
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Several scholars and commentators, for example, panned 
Twitter’s announcement that it would “ban” political advertis-
ing.431 Such a sweeping prohibition overlooks that advertising 
can have positive effects.432 Political ads—especially cheaper 
digital ads—allow down-ballot candidates and challengers to in-
cumbents to gain initial exposure, fostering greater political 
competition.433 And, a rule that would prohibit political issue ad-
vertising but not commercial advertising could have the unin-
tentional effect of entrenching corporate power.434 Consider how 
such a rule would apply to ads warning about climate change or 
advocating for a carbon tax as compared to ads “selling SUVs, 
encouraging people to eat beef, or buy single-family homes.”435 
What about ads for greater privacy regulations versus ads for 
new tech products?436 “In a sense, every ad for a brand or product 
is an advertisement for capitalism and consumerism”437 and fo-
cusing on political ad regulation alone might privilege existing 
economic structures.  
Twitter eventually rolled out a more detailed policy prohib-
iting ads from government officials, candidates, parties, and 
PACs and any ads that reference a candidate, political party, 
elected or appointed government official, election, referendum, 
ballot measure, legislation, regulation, directive, or judicial out-
come.438 For issue ads, Twitter decided to permit ads that align 
 
 431. See, e.g., Joan Donovan et al., What Does Twitter’s Ban on Political Ads 
Mean for Platform Governance?, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 
(Nov. 5, 2019), https://cigionline.org/articles/what-does-twitters-ban-political 
-ads-mean-platform-governance [https://perma.cc/CQX4-DM54]; Shannon C. 
McGregor, Why Twitter’s Ban on Political Ads Isn’t as Good as It Sounds, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2019/nov/04/twitters-political-ads-ban [https://perma.cc/2FLW-QNAP]; Will 
Oremus, Twitter’s Ban on Political Ads Will Hurt Activists, Labor Groups, and 
Organizers, ONEZERO (Oct. 31, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/twitters 
-ban-on-political-ads-will-hurt-activists-labor-groups-and-organizers 
-c339908b841d [https://perma.cc/D38G-NJGK]; Stewart, supra note 428. 
 432. See supra text accompanying notes 330–31. 
 433. See Daniel Kreiss & Matt Perault, Four Ways To Fix Social Media’s 
Political Ads Problem—Without Banning Them, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2019), 
https://nytimes.com/2019/11/16/opinion/twitter-facebook-political-ads.html 
[https://perma.cc/3XJY-YV5H]. 
 434. See Oremus, supra note 431. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. 
 438. Political Content, supra note 425; Political Content FAQs, TWITTER, 
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/prohibited-content-policies/ 
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with an advertiser’s “publicly stated values” while limiting the 
micro-targeting of ads that “drive political, judicial, legislative, 
or regulatory outcomes.”439 For such ads, Twitter says it will dis-
able its “tailored audiences” tool and prevent targeting by ZIP 
code or political affiliation.440  
Google rolled out a revised policy soon thereafter, limiting 
election-ad microtargeting to the general categories of age, gen-
der, and general location (postal code level) and eliminating the 
ability of campaigns to match people’s online profiles with voter 
data in order to target tailored audiences.441 Google will continue 
to allow political advertisers to do “contextual targeting, such as 
serving ads to people reading or watching a story about, say, the 
economy.”442 
These private policies raise important questions and options 
for legislators to consider. While there may be value in providing 
platforms some space to experiment—“best practices” could vary 
by platform or evolve in response to changing conditions—legis-
latures are not constitutionally compelled to stand aside and 
hope for the best. Two general policies appear to command wide-
spread support: limiting micro-targeting and enhancing trans-
parency.  
Micro-targeting enables advertisers to tailor ads to the spe-
cific proclivities and predispositions of particular individuals.443 
 
political-content/political-content-faqs11.html [https://perma.cc/ER4Y-V93B]. 
 439. Cause-Based Advertising Policy, TWITTER, https://business.twitter.com/ 
en/help/ads-policies/restricted-content-policies/cause-based-advertising.html 
[https://perma.cc/K99A-JK59]. 
 440. Id.; see Taylor Hatmaker, Twitter Will Ban Politicians from Buying All 
Ads, in Stark Contrast with Facebook, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 15, 2019, 1:28 PM), 
https://thedailybeast.com/twitter-will-ban-politicians-from-buying-all-ads-in 
-stark-contrast-with-facebook [https://perma.cc/ES8H-QHBP]. 
 441. An Update on Our Political Ads Policy, supra note 425; see Emily Stew-
art, Why Everybody Is Freaking Out About Political Ads on Facebook and 
Google, VOX (Nov. 27, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://vox.com/recode/2019/11/27/ 
20977988/google-facebook-political-ads-targeting-twitter-disinformation 
[https://perma.cc/D5XZ-TQVF]. 
 442. GOOGLE, supra note 425. 
 443. See, e.g., Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Real Reason Facebook Won’t Fact-
Check Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://nytimes.com/2019/11/02/ 
opinion/facebook-zuckerberg-political-ads.html [https://perma.cc/KQS8-ZSPN] 
(“Currently, two people in the same household can receive different ads from 
the same candidate running for state senate. That means a candidate can lie to 
one or both voters and they might never know about the other’s ads. This data-
driven obscurity limits accountability and full deliberation.”). 
  
2020] FIGHTING FOR ATTENTION 2239 
 
Putting limits on the types of data advertisers can bring to plat-
forms and the categories advertisers can target444 would curb the 
greatest risks associated with advertisers’ purchased exposure 
while enhancing its competitive benefits. Advertisers would re-
main free to craft content aimed at particular groups of listeners, 
but by curbing the practice of micro-targeting (i.e., regulating 
the vehicle of advertising) Congress could ensure that “people not 
in those groups would see those tailored messages as well.”445 
This is the kind of structural market regulation that silences no 
speaker and reflects a “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open.”446  
Congress could also require micro-targeting to be fully 
transparent to the listener or viewer.  
Can I see if a political advertiser used [a] custom audience tool, and if 
so, if my email address was uploaded? Can I see what ‘look-alike audi-
ence’ advertisers . . . are seeking? Can I see a true, verified name of the 
advertiser in the disclaimer . . . ? Can I see if and how [a platform’s] 
algorithms amplified the ad?447  
Such transparency and disclosure measures appear consistent 
not only with an attentional-choice doctrine but with existing 
doctrine as well.448 
Indeed, there are good reasons to consider extending such 
transparency regulations to all advertising—political and com-
mercial.449 To start, such regulations make more information 
 
 444. See Kreiss & Perault, supra note 433. 
 445. See Vaidhyanathan, supra note 443. 
 446. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 447. Yaël Eisenstat, I Worked on Political Ads at Facebook. They Profit by 
Manipulating Us., WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://washingtonpost 
.com/outlook/2019/11/04/i-worked-political-ads-facebook-they-profit-by 
-manipulating-us/ [https://perma.cc/8D4N-XRBL]. 
 448. See Hasen, supra note 246, at 21–30 (describing campaign finance dis-
closure law serving a similar type of “information interest”). But see Wash. Post 
v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 523 (4th Cir. 2019) (invalidating a Maryland law 
imposing disclosure-and-recordkeeping requirements on online platforms ra-
ther than political actors). 
 449. See Tarleton Gillespie, We Need To Fix Online Advertising. All of It., 
SLATE (Nov. 15, 2019, 7:11 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/11/twitter 
-political-ad-ban-online-advertising.html [https://perma.cc/77Z6-47FK] (“[A]ny 
restriction of political advertising will stumble on the same fundamental ques-
tion: What counts as ‘political’? The solution, I think, requires a much grander 
intervention.”). 
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and context—“more speech”—available to consumers who are in-
terested in understanding who has gained purchased access to 
their attention and how.450 Congress could require online ads to 
include a link to information on that ad: whether a platform con-
sulted on the ad, who purchased the ad, how the ad has traveled 
through the platform’s network, etc.451 This could even apply to 
traditional media. Television and newspaper ads might include 
a QR code linking viewers to more detailed information on the 
ad’s source, terms, and scope.  
A law that covered all advertising would also avoid exces-
sive entanglement with a legendarily challenging issue: the line 
between political and non-political content. As Twitter soon dis-
covered452 (and as campaign-finance scholars have long recog-
nized453), separating the political from the non-political is no 
easy task in theory, let alone in practice. This is especially so at 
scale.454 
Nonetheless, if Congress enacted a statute that distin-
guished between political and non-political content with respect 
to advertising regulations, the law might be less fraught with 
First Amendment risk than one might expect. Unlike laws that 
restrict (or theories that could restrict)455 expression or distribu-
tion based on the distinction between political and non-political 
content, a law applying solely to advertising would not burden 
the exercise of any core First Amendment right. This would sig-
nificantly reduce the constitutional consequences of the particu-
lar line drawn. Congress might, for example, rely upon an atten-
tional-choice theory to justify limiting political advertising 
expenditures (even as political-speech or -distribution expendi-
tures remain unlimited).456 Or Congress might determine that 
some of its advertising regulations—such as microtargeting re-
strictions or transparency requirements—should only apply to 
political content. 
 
 450. See supra Parts I.A, III.B.1.  
 451. See Gillespie, supra note 449. 
 452. See id. 
 453. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 n.16 (2003) (“What sepa-
rates issue advocacy and political advocacy is a line in the sand drawn on a 
windy day.” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 537 (D.D.C. 
2003))). 
 454. See Gillespie, supra note 449. 
 455. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 298, at 20–35. 
 456. Compare Part III.B.3, with Parts III.B.1–2. 
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Drawing a line between political and non-political content 
in these kinds of contexts is similar to the line the Supreme 
Court has allowed in the context of eligibility for tax deductions 
(where expenditures for routine “trade advertising” are treated 
differently than expenditures for “lobbying purposes, the promo-
tion or defeat of legislation, the exploitation of propaganda, in-
cluding advertising other than trade advertising, and contribu-
tions for campaign expenses”).457 Nothing about the distinction 
drawn actually restrains any actor from producing content or 
making that content available to the public. 
 To be sure, any law enacted by Congress that draws such a 
distinction is almost certain to receive strict scrutiny (especially 
given the Court’s overly broad approach to identifying content-
based laws).458 But a law that is tailored to regulate the terms of 
access to attention for political ads should survive scrutiny given 
the central importance of earning societal exposure in a compet-
itive marketplace of ideas. 
Even arguments about potential chill lack force in the ad-
vertising-expenditures context. Someone who plays it safe to 
avoid an ad-buy in violation of the boundary line would not be 
engaging in any self-censorship since that very same content (po-
litical or otherwise) could be expressed and distributed without 
limitation. In fact, drawing a line between attention costs and 
expression/distribution costs could help “thaw” expression that 
may be chilled by the complexity of existing regulations.459  
No doubt there would be advertisements that tread the 
boundary between political and non-political. And there may be 
various acceptable definitions available to the legislature—some 
 
 457. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326 (1941); see also Cam-
marano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 499–500 (1959). The Court has also up-
held statutes regulating “political” activities in other contexts. See, e.g., U.S. 
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 550–51 
(1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 (1973). 
 458. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2237–39 (2015) (Kagan, 
J., concurring) (contending that strict scrutiny should apply only when there is 
a “realistic possibility that [the] official suppression of ideas is afoot” (quoting 
Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007))). 
 459. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 319, 324 (2010) (“Prolix laws chill 
speech for the same reason that vague laws chill speech: People ‘of common in-
telligence must necessarily guess at [the law’s] meaning and differ as to its ap-
plication.’” (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926))). 
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narrower,460 some broader.461 There are no simple answers to 
what qualifies as “political” in a democracy. That there are likely 
to be close cases, however, “is not a reason to refuse to draw a 
line and so deny majorities the power to govern in areas where 
their power is legitimate.”462  
Under an attentional-choice theory, the more consequential 
line-drawing for First Amendment purposes might actually end 
up being the line between advertisements and expressive con-
duct. At first glance, this should not seem difficult: no one who 
watches a YouTube video has trouble distinguishing the content 
they sought from the ad that precedes it; no one who watches TV 
mistakes a commercial break for the program.  
Yet, the line can get much blurrier—and presumably would 
in the face of regulation. How should one treat influencers, prod-
uct placements, and sponsored content? Itemization of expendi-
tures might be appropriate in some cases—distinguishing be-
tween payments for editorial assistance and payments for 
placement—but such an approach may not adequately address 
all possible permutations for mixing paid exposure with organic 
consumer interest.  
Depending on how demanding they are, advertising regula-
tions could also raise an important second-order concern: the 
risk of diminished advertising revenues. Many intermediaries 
and content providers in today’s society have ad-driven business 
models. Even a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation463 that 
curtails attention expenditures (political or otherwise) would ef-
fectively raise the cost of access and availability to consumers to 
gain information they desire from platforms and providers they 
have chosen in the marketplace of ideas.  
 
 460. See, e.g., Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018) (any 
advertisement that “display[s] a candidate’s name, likeness, or logo” or “dis-
play[s] a ballot measure’s [or legislative bill’s] number, title, [or] subject” (quot-
ing Cal. Elec. Code Ann. § 319.5 (West Cum. Supp. 2018))). 
 461. See, e.g., Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. § 8(a) (2017) (governing 
any advertisement that “is made by or on behalf of a candidate; or communi-
cates a message relating to any political matter of national importance, includ-
ing—a candidate; any election to Federal office; or a national legislative issue of 
public importance”). 
 462. Bork, supra note 298, at 28. 
 463. The First Amendment forbids Congress from targeting particular pub-
lishers with discriminatory taxes or regulations. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press 
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 239 (1936). 
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Given that advertisements necessarily gain exposure that is 
not based on consumer demand, however, Congress should re-
ceive reasonable latitude to strike an appropriate balance. Any 
action in this area would involve regulating an economic ex-
change that pulls in two opposing constitutional directions (i.e., 
how private subsidies improve ideational competition versus 
how unearned access undermines ideational competition). 
Whether Congress addresses this concern by tailoring the regu-
lations to a very narrow class of political-attention expendi-
tures464 or whether Congress casts a broader net, regulates all 
advertisements, and offsets lost revenues with public subsi-
dies,465 the Court should recognize that a range of reasonable al-
ternatives might be available.  
 
 464. Political ads may warrant tailored regulatory treatment in a way that 
shampoo ads do not, for political speech stands at “the heart of what the First 
Amendment is meant to protect.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Ironically, the very importance of political speech under 
the First Amendment means that “buying reach” raises the most sensitive ques-
tions about whose ideas get exposure in society—and on what basis. 
 465. Any number of public subsidy models might protect the vitality of the 
free press and enhance free competition in the marketplace of ideas. See C. Ed-
win Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2178–
219 (1992). Indeed, “the United States was once a pioneer in government subsi-
dization of the media. Postal subsidies that allowed newspapers and magazines 
to flow virtually free to subscribers through the mail made the media in the 
United States the envy of European observers like Alexis de Tocqueville in the 
nineteenth century.” Woodcock, supra note 331, at 2338; see also Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (per curiam) (“Our statute books are replete 
with laws providing financial assistance to the exercise of free speech, such as 
aid to public broadcasting and other forms of educational media, and preferen-
tial postal rates and antitrust exemptions for newspapers.” (citations omitted)); 
Lewis Publ’g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 304–05 (1913) (upholding the ability 
of the government to provide special “second-class mail” subsidies to publica-
tions “to secure to the public the benefits to result from ‘the wide dissemination 
of intelligence as to current events’” and to deny the second-class rate to “publi-
cations designed primarily for advertising purposes”). 
  In fact, public subsidies might lessen the media’s subservience to eco-
nomic pressures, thereby helping to align the marketplace of ideas even closer 
with the interests and choices of consumers. See Jiyoung Han & Christopher M. 
Federico, The Polarizing Effect of News Framing: Comparing the Mediating 
Roles of Motivated Reasoning, Self-Stereotyping, and Intergroup Animus, 68 J. 
COMM. 685, 687, 703 (2018) (finding that “conflict framing” in the media has 
polarizing effects and observing that America’s greater use of conflict-frames 
may be, in part, a function of its largely commercialized media environment); 
Woodcock, supra note 331, at 2339 n.336 (quoting Rodney Benson et al., Public 
Media Autonomy and Accountability: Best and Worst Policy Practices in 12 
Leading Democracies, 11 INT’L J. COMM. 1, 3, 15, 22 (2017)). If media was free 
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Finally, if all else fails and the Supreme Court strikes down 
all interventions without providing additional guidance on how 
a marketplace of ideas should be expected to function, Congress 
might have one option left: outlaw private anticompetitive be-
havior in simple, broad language modeled on the Sherman Act 
and leave the courts to explain how a marketplace of ideas is 
supposed to work.466 
The campaign finance battle to date has been a war of attri-
tion. Legislators (or voters) enact reforms only to see the courts 
invalidate them (or wound them so severely that their demise 
might be preferable).467 Rather than drafting narrow and tech-
nical laws, perhaps Congress could broaden them to the level of 
generality provided by the Court itself. Such a statute would pro-
hibit unreasonable restraints of trade in the marketplace of 
ideas and grant private parties and the FEC the power to sue in 
federal court to enforce the law.  
Passing a “Political Sherman Act” would force the Supreme 
Court to grapple with its own doctrine. The “marketplace of 
ideas” cannot simultaneously be so amorphous that judicial elab-
oration is impossible and so robust that legislative action is im-
permissible. If the Court cannot explain how the marketplace of 
ideas functions, then it must either allow Congress its due exer-
cise of powers or cease relying on a vague metaphor for such pro-
found judicial decisions. 
V.  POWER, POLARIZATION, AND PRACTICAL 
CONSEQUENCES 
Reorienting First Amendment debates around attentional 
choice (and the terms of access to our attention) would center the 
role that social groups, informational intermediaries, and other 
constituencies play in mobilizing and exercising political power. 
 
to appeal incrementally more to our aspirational selves and incrementally less 
to our behavioral selves, all the better for our own personal growth and the 
health of our democracy. See supra text accompanying notes 257–71. 
 466. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
 467. See, e.g., Robert G. Boatright, Part 1: Competing Perspectives on Cam-
paign Finance Regulation, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE: THE PROBLEMS AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF REFORM 15, 15 (Robert G. Boatright ed., 2011) (arguing that be-
cause judicial decisions have crafted strange rules based on unrealistic 
distinctions, “we have a set of laws that neither [the right nor the left] would 
have sought to create had they been starting from scratch”).  
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More deeply exploring these dynamics seems overdue as a mat-
ter of constitutional study and scholarship,468 but readers might 
have a more pressing question: What are the practical conse-
quences of this theory for a fractured and polarized political com-
munity? 
On one hand, privileging attentional choice seems like a pos-
itive step. Respecting the role that associations and relation-
ships play in our lives could enhance democratic accountability 
while dismantling the Court’s cripplingly dysfunctional cam-
paign-finance jurisprudence. Today campaigns spend a majority 
of their budget on advertising;469 representatives engage in 
round-the-clock fundraising;470 and a whole new industry of elec-
tion professionals overemphasize capital-intensive activities, 
underemphasize grassroots outreach, and distort the complexion 
of those who seek office.471  
None of this leads to meaningful representation. Over-
whelming empirical evidence confirms that elections are not ty-
ing officeholders to the preferences of voters.472 Large democra-
cies simply “do not work through individualistic citizen 
engagement.”473 
 
 468. See Heather K. Gerken, The Discursive Benefits of Structure: Federal-
ism and the First Amendment, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY, supra note 143, 
at 68, 76 (“Power relations tend to be understudied in the literature on the First 
Amendment. The role of groups is underplayed.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword, 
Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 38 (2016) (“[T]he ulti-
mate holders of power in American democracy are not government institutions 
like Congress and the President but democratic-level interests.”). 
 469. See El-Haj, supra note 77, at 1294 (noting that 2008 presidential cam-
paigns spent nearly 60% of their budgets on advertising). 
 470. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CON-
GRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 138–39 (2011). The ramifications of this are 
severe. See Anthony J. Gaughan, The Forty-Year War on Money in Politics: Wa-
tergate, FECA, and the Future of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 
791, 820 (2016) (“Members no longer have the time to master public policy is-
sues in depth or regularly attend committee meetings. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, the typical member of Congress has become dependent on lobbyists and 
congressional leaders for information on the legislation pending before Con-
gress.”); id. at 823 (“The demeaning and exhausting demands of fundraising 
have driven experienced officeholders to resign and have deterred talented can-
didates from running for office in the first place.”). 
 471. See Robert Yablon, Campaigns, Inc., 103 MINN. L. REV. 151, 154–56 
(2018). 
 472. See El-Haj, supra note 77, at 1243–44 (citing LARRY M. BARTELS, UNE-
QUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 287 
(2008)). 
 473. Michael J. Malbin, Three Policy Paths After Citizens United: A Critical 
  
2246 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2157 
 
Strengthening ties between constituents, associations (po-
litical and civic), and representatives could significantly improve 
democratic responsiveness and accountability.474 Such relation-
ships and social groupings help create “a two-way street of com-
munication between elites and ordinary citizens,”475 giving indi-
viduals a more meaningful voice.476 
In other words, if we want elections to actually convey policy 
content, that content must come from the relationships between 
parties and social groups.477 Like buyer cooperatives in the mar-
ket, social groups offer a stronger anchor for transmitting de-
mands: “When coalitions shift, politicians scramble to adjust 
their policy positions accordingly.”478 Politicians that find it 
harder to market themselves via advertising “would continue to 
court votes on some kind of wholesale level[] seek[ing] the sup-
port of intermediaries who could ‘deliver’ bundles of votes di-
rectly.”479 This is a feature, not a flaw.  
From a democracy-realist perspective, such dynamics 
ground politics in “the mediating influence” of groups that are 
“engaged in the give and take of party and coalitional politics.”480 
And, if “political money, like water, has to go some-
where . . . [and] is part of a broader ecosystem,”481 then the redi-
rection of political spending from ads to organizations might help 
rebuild the capacity of these vital democratic institutions. Ra-
ther than suppressing the influence of organic, grassroots organ-
izing efforts and local political parties, money might reduce the 
economic barriers faced by people-powered movements and help 
amplify their efforts. The more money plowed back into building 
out intermediary organizations, the better our politics might 
function. 
From an information-realist perspective, group dynamics 
contextualize content482 and require that its attentional priority 
 
Review Essay, 52 TULSA L. REV. 537, 542 (2017). 
 474. See El-Haj, supra note 77, at 1256. 
 475. Id. at 1254. 
 476. See Malbin, supra note 473, at 542 (“Intermediary organizations are 
necessary to give individuals an effective voice.”). 
 477. See ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 266. 
 478. Id. (citation omitted).  
 479. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 357, at 1729. 
 480. Id. at 1714.  
 481. Id. at 1708.  
 482. See Strong, supra note 76, at 141–42. 
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be earned rather than bought. Social groups have “a set of ongo-
ing concerns and challenges, and a vocabulary for discussing 
them.”483 Being fluent in these concerns and this vocabulary is 
part of how politicians convey connection and win support.484  
This is not about pandering. Trust matters. Civic ties485 and 
reputation486 have provided a foundation for meaningful politi-
cal alignment since our nation’s earliest elections. Elected offi-
cials tend to be more reliable representatives of their communi-
ties’ interests when they actually come from those 
communities.487 Members of Congress with blue-collar back-
grounds more dependably defend blue-collar interests.488 Black 
legislators are more likely than comparable white legislators to 
vote for policies that support people of color.489 A whole range of 
characteristics can “cause [legislators] to deviate from party or-
thodoxy” in ways pertinent to those characteristics.490  
Thus, shifting to a doctrine that recognizes the relational 
nature of information and ascribes social groups (and choices 
about social groups) constitutional significance could be seen as 
a positive development. Laissez-faire doctrine incorrectly as-
sumes that the marketplace of ideas allows a rational atomistic 
 
 483. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 309. 
 484. See id.; see also Magda Hinojosa et al., Speaking as a Woman: Descrip-
tive Presentation and Representation in Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly, 39 J. 
WOMEN POL. & POL’Y 407, 411, 423 (2018) (studying “descriptive presentation” 
and the ways in which legislators invoke their identity and draw on their per-
sonal experiences in speechmaking as a way to establish authority). 
 485. See El-Haj, supra note 77, at 1264 (“[P]rior to the advent of mass media, 
candidates needed ‘to build extensive interpersonal networks not confined to 
particular occupational or social circles’ to garner reputation and votes. As such, 
the path to political power ran through membership in socioeconomically inte-
grated civic associations . . . . Political elites were thereby prevented from be-
coming socially insulated from the rest of American society.”). 
 486. See KUHNER, supra note 23, at 145 (“Electioneering during the founding 
era did not involve large sums of money. Candidates stood for election based on 
their reputation among voters and thus spent little on advertising and cam-
paigning.” (emphasis added)). 
 487. See ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 309. 
 488. NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE 
OF CLASS IN ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 109–36, 143 (2013).  
 489. ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 67, at 309. 
 490. Id. 
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voter to align her ex nihilo policy preferences with the corre-
sponding party’s issue platform.491 An attentional-choice ap-
proach might do something more concrete and realistic: send 
someone the community trusts—someone who understands 
what the community needs—to represent it in Congress.492  
On the other hand, privileging attentional choice could seem 
dangerous—a doubling-down on our worst impulses. One partic-
ularly effective manipulator of attention comes to mind: Donald 
Trump. Throughout the 2016 elections, Trump benefited from 
outrageous statements, lies, and racist and xenophobic appeals 
that drove a massive amount of organic attention and free media 
coverage.493 Historically, both presidential candidates in a gen-
eral election receive roughly the same amounts of news cover-
age.494 In 2016, however, Trump “received more coverage than 
Clinton almost every day between June 1 and Election Day, in-
cluding 63 percent of cable news mentions and 69 percent of the 
solo-headlined stories.”495  
There is little that an attentional-choice approach to the 
First Amendment would do to rein in this kind of influence. Can-
didates would remain free to say what they want,496 and the 
press would remain free to cover them. Our recourse as a viewing 
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audience and a voting public would remain limited to the TV re-
mote and the ballot box. 
Of course, the ability to regulate advertising (and ad ex-
penditures) could have impacted a number of ways in which 
Trump’s genuinely viral messaging was artificially amplified 
through attentional purchases. For one thing, Trump did not 
start out as a widely popular figure with a broad base of small-
donor support. His campaign’s initial advertising efforts relied 
heavily upon big donors and self-funding.497  
On the domestic side, this money was plowed overwhelm-
ingly into surgically targeted digital advertising.498 “By Cam-
bridge Analytica’s account, the campaign targeted 13.5 million 
persuadable voters in sixteen battleground states,” including po-
tential Trump voters (to boost turnout) and “white liberals, 
young women, and African Americans” (to reduce turnout).499 On 
an average day, the campaign would “fe[e]d Facebook between 
50,000 and 60,000 different versions of its advertise-
ments . . . [s]ome were aimed at just a few dozen voters in a par-
ticular district.”500 The campaign would “experiment[] with dif-
ferent versions and drop[] ineffective ones.”501 
On the foreign side, Russian propagandists relied heavily 
upon organic social media circulation, but paid ads often pro-
vided a springboard, connecting new audiences to unpaid con-
tent.502 On Twitter, “promoted tweets” appeared in approxi-
mately 53.5 million users’ feeds.503 On Facebook, approximately 
11.4 million users saw Russia-linked paid ads.504 If a user “liked” 
or “shared” the paid content, the advertiser’s unpaid posts would 
appear in the user’s feed from that point forward, often without 
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the subscriber realizing it.505 Over 126 million users were ex-
posed to posts on Facebook in this manner.506 That is about 40% 
of the U.S. population.507 
Meaningful regulations might have put a damper on these 
practices. Nonetheless, no interpretation of the First Amend-
ment allowing attentional choices to drive exposure would con-
tain a force like Trump. In explaining Trump’s rise, the role of 
advertising and paid access to attention pales in comparison to 
the role that his messaging and social mobilization played.508 “By 
emphasizing certain issues or speaking directly to certain 
groups, candidates can make those issues and group identities 
more salient to voters and more predictive of their choices.”509 
For Trump, this meant raising the salience of race as a driving 
(and dividing) social identity—an approach with profound con-
sequences for the election and for our society.510  
No one should expect any kind of market-based doctrine to 
cure these ills. A borderline-religious faith that a free-speech 
“market” can or necessarily would promote “good” speech is 
ironic. Markets reward demand—and a sober look at our demons 
suggests there is great demand for villains and scapegoats, for 
clear enemies and simple fixes. The First Amendment need not 
condemn us to our worst instincts, but we should not expect it to 
save us from them.  
Nonetheless, an attentional-choice approach might still be a 
step in the right direction. First, by identifying the nature of the 
market and opening up space for legislation to help structure the 
market, a degree of self-governance can re-enter the picture. 
Limiting advertising expenditures or reining in micro-targeting 
might encourage more open, inclusive, and broader debates, with 
candidates building consensus and community rather than frag-
menting society down to the smallest, manipulable denominator. 
Such political dialogue does the democracy-enhancing work of 
finding areas of commonality “upon which [our] wishes safely 
can be carried out.”511  
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Second, by connecting the doctrinal framework with an in-
quiry into how ideas actually generate attention and earn expo-
sure in society, the legislative interventions above (as well as the 
courts’ understanding of its own role) can be informed by evolv-
ing empirical understandings. Rather than casting these in-
sights aside, courts and legislatures might be able to develop an 
ever more nuanced understanding of what genuine attentional 
choice really means and how it might be protected—all while 
staying grounded to an enduring constitutional principle. 
Finally, building a system in which relationships, trust, and 
community reputation matter more than proximity to wealth or 
fundraising prowess could expand the pool of candidates who 
choose to run in the first place. “Democratic governance can func-
tion properly only when competent types who reflect the desires 
of their constituents stand up and seek political office.”512 The 
dynamics of this “candidate supply” question have received sur-
prisingly little study,513 but Professor Andrew Hall suggests that 
the fundraising and campaigning burdens placed upon modern 
candidates are depriving voters of the opportunity to vote on 
more moderate candidates.514  
Legislation that incentivizes more candidates to run for of-
fice could ease one source of the polarization gripping our politi-
cal system. Currently, “[l]egislators might polarize even if voters 
do not want them to, because voters can only elect representa-
tives from among the set of people who run for office.”515 Hall 
found that roughly “80 percent of polarization exists no matter 
which candidates voters choose from . . . [because] it is already 
baked into the set of people who [have chosen to] run for of-
fice.”516 Meaningful reform might improve these numbers.517 
Who chooses to run, how they choose to appeal to us, and 
what stories they decide to tell matter. Each of us belongs to 
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many groups—place of birth, place of residence, ethnicity, reli-
gion, gender, occupation—“but simply being a member of a group 
is not the same thing as identifying or sympathizing with that 
group.”518 Political actors activate which communities we iden-
tify with through their rhetoric. They give certain identities 
more prominence, more meaning, and more importance as a de-
cision-making criterion.519 They help us define ourselves. Madi-
son and Holmes recognized this—that we are social beings and 
that our understanding of the world will always be shaped by 
our experiences and associations.520 Our judicial doctrines and 
institutions must recognize that reality, not run from it.  
As listeners and as members of the political community—as 
partners in this exchange521—we have the power and responsi-
bility to use our judgment wisely, to decide what (and who) is 
worthy of our time and attention, and to reward that which 
makes our country and ourselves better. Our choices matter—
and the First Amendment should reflect that. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Holmes once said, “[t]he life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience.”522 Our nation’s experience in the 
shadow of the Supreme Court’s modern market metaphor should 
give the Justices pause. Our autonomy and democracy face grow-
ing threats from more powerful private forces than the Founders 
could have ever imagined. The First Amendment does not con-
demn us to helplessly submit to their control.  
With respect to autonomy, the increasingly sophisticated 
and voracious operations of attention brokers are beginning to 
test the boundaries of free attentional choice and to endanger 
that most fundamental First Amendment right: the freedom of 
thought. Since “attention is always being spent on something,” 
competitors for attentional-choice “necessarily must displace 
something that already has some hold on the attention de-
sired.”523 When consumers make free attentional choices—say, 
deciding to switch from The New York Times to The Economist—
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the marketplace of ideas protects autonomy and enhances the 
power to form one’s own beliefs. 
When consumers become trapped in patterns that resemble 
addiction, however, attentional “choice” becomes an illusion and 
the fair exchange between consumer and producer evaporates. 
The growing power of machine learning, data analytics, and 
habit-forming design to exploit known psychological weaknesses 
and keep consumers dependent threatens to rob us of truly free 
thought and to render our conscious experience no more than a 
resource to be mined for profit.  
If these practices only disrupted a genuine choice between 
competing information providers, that would be bad enough. To-
day, however, the capacity sought by attention merchants is just 
as likely to come from “the conquest of attentional ‘green-
fields’”—time that used to be spent on friends, families, civic as-
sociations, and community groups; on exploring and enjoying 
new hobbies, taking walks, and the simple but profound act of 
reflecting.524 This conquest could be expected to have a much 
more drastic effect on our lives, our relationships, our communi-
ties, our civic society—our very humanity. 
Ensuring that we, the people, retain the power to promote 
free competition in the marketplace of ideas and to ensure fair 
terms of access to our attention will be vital to protecting true 
autonomy and genuine freedom of thought in the coming era.525 
The First Amendment rightfully protects us from a government 
bent on subjugation, suppression, and thought-control; it does 
not demand that we unilaterally disarm and wholly cede control 
to private entities that seek the same. 
With respect to democracy, the picture is no less bleak. Of-
ficeholders now spend up to seventy percent of their time raising 
money526 and are too busy to hold committee meetings,527 read 
bills,528 or do the actual job of policymaking.529 Floor “debates” 
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involve few members,530 and majority gatherings are now “al-
most exclusively ceremonial.”531 Members of both parties have 
skipped classified intelligence briefings on terrorist activities to 
attend out-of-state fundraisers,532 and committee positions are 
increasingly awarded based on fundraising ability rather than 
experience, expertise, or interest.533  
Not only do well-funded interests have the power to skew 
public debate by purchasing unlimited societal exposure, some-
times the threat alone is enough to snap politicians into line.534 
In this world, where money matters more than ideas, party lead-
ers ask candidates, “How is this quarter looking?” “What did 
your opponent raise?” and “How many hours of call time do you 
have scheduled this month?” rather than, “What are you hearing 
on the campaign trail?” “What issues are resonating with vot-
ers?” and “How many community events did you attend this 
week?”535 These are not corrupt actors (such that “throwing the 
bums out” might provide remedy). These are “ordinary people 
responding logically to powerful incentives”536 created by the Su-
preme Court’s laissez-faire doctrine.  
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Our legislative processes have become virtually unrespon-
sive to the average American537—a shift that has not gone unno-
ticed by voters. An astounding 96% of Americans blame money 
in politics for our political dysfunction.538 When asked “who has 
the most influence on how members of Congress vote,” 54% of 
Democrats and 50% of Republicans said “special interests and 
lobbyists,” with “campaign contributors” coming in a close sec-
ond.539 Second to last were “constituents,” with just 11% of Dem-
ocrats and 15% of Republicans.540 (Last place? “[Legislators’] 
own conscience.”)541  
Americans’ confidence in Congress reflects this displeasure, 
dropping as low as 7% in recent years.542 This was “not only the 
lowest on record, but also the lowest Gallup ha[d] recorded for 
any institution in [its] 41-year[s]” of gauging Americans’ confi-
dence in seventeen major U.S. institutions.543 As Lawrence Les-
sig has noted, “when we waged a Revolutionary War against the 
British Crown, more than [seven] percent of the American people 
had confidence in King George III.”544 That popular outrage did 
not end well for King George, and it does not bode well for the 
institutional stability and durability of our government. 
The Supreme Court’s own reputation is also at stake. Citi-
zens United is widely recognized by name and is despised, with 
over 80% of Americans saying it should be overturned,545 and al-
most 90% saying there should be restrictions in place to limit the 
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influence of the rich on political campaigns.546 Even the donors 
hate the system, with 80% regularly pressured by officeholders 
to contribute and 74% supporting expenditure caps.547 This 
“overwhelming popular opposition to Citizens United suggests 
that . . . the [C]ourt ha[s] acted against widely and deeply held 
opinions about what it means to be a democracy and how our 
democracy should work.”548 
The First Amendment does not consign us to this fate. The 
marketplace of ideas—and electoral campaigns—functioned 
quite well before the massive influx of political advertising 
money. Before the 1950s, “ordinary voters still had an important 
role in elections . . . . Footwork on the ground—getting voters to 
the polls and persuading them to vote for a candidate—was prob-
ably the most important part of campaigning.”549 Such methods 
were not just a product of the times; they are integral to how we 
create genuine political communities, transmit meaningful po-
litical information, and hold our representatives accountable.550  
Holmes once quipped that “[a] good catchword can obscure 
analysis for fifty years.”551 At 100 years, his “marketplace” has 
done one better. Developing a more principled and coherent ap-
proach to First Amendment analysis will not happen overnight. 
But the time and attention will be worth it.  
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